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 Abstract 
 We hypothesize that prestigious golf courses attract golfers and visitors from 
across the country, providing greater opportunities for nearby investors to build 
social connections. Our evidence suggests that institutional investors located near 
prestigious golf courses earn significantly better benchmark- and risk-adjusted 
returns. This reflects the benefits of sociability as our findings are stronger for golf 
courses with reciprocal guest policies that allow wider participation and increase 
when major golf championships rotate to the state. Their portfolios reveal 
hallmarks of active trading – higher concentration, greater selectivity, more frequent 
turnover – and include more distant stocks. To establish a causal link, we exploit 
the fact that golf is a weather-dependent outdoor activity. We find that their 
outperformance occurs during times of low precipitation around golf courses, 
evaporating when bad weather keeps golfers off the greens.  
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1 Introduction 
Social connections significantly affect economic and financial decisions. Recent studies find 
that social connections influence the portfolio holdings of professional investors. These 
studies rise to the challenge of measuring social networks by analyzing school ties (Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008) or identifying word-of-mouth communications (Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein, 2005; Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker, 2014). 
 Our study adds to this growing literature by identifying country clubs and golf 
courses as important social venues that attract golfers and visitors from across the country, 
stimulating social activities and facilitating information flow into the local area. We 
hypothesize that institutional investors located close to prestigious golf courses have better 
opportunities to build social connections and to gather investment-related information. 
As a result, they may generate better performance.  
 There are at least three reasons why golf courses may enhance social vibrancy and 
stimulate social interactions for nearby investors. First, golf is one of the most popular 
leisure activities among high net worth individuals. In 2012, there were 29 million total 
golfers in the U.S.,1 representing 9.6% of the total population. Golfers have an average 
household income of $95,000, are predominantly male (77.5%), and are likely to own 
securities (83%). 79% of golfers have a personal net worth over $100,000. Also, many 
golfers have a great passion for the sport.2 The 2003 National Golf Foundation estimates 
                                            
1 A golfer is defined as anyone having played an 18-hole round in the last 12-months. These statistics are 
available at http://www.statisticbrain.com/golf-player-demographic-statistics/.  
2 Not surprisingly, corporate executives are avid golfers. Golf Digest magazine regularly publishes rankings 
of the top 200 U.S. CEOs. The CEOs surveyed by Golf Digest report that 35 percent of their golf rounds 
are with business associates, and 71 percent have conducted business with someone they met when playing 
a round of golf. (http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/07/news/funny/ceo_golf/) 
2 
 
that approximately 11 million U.S. golfers travel within the country to play golf, and 
around 35% of these trips include air travel (Hudson and Hudson, 2010). 
 Second, prestigious golf courses and country clubs are popular social activity centers 
that host charity events, weddings, industry conventions, and golf tournaments. These 
activities attract golfers and visitors from around the country. For example, the recent 
2015 U.S. Open in University Place, Washington attracted over 270,000 outside visitors 
among which 75% earned an average wage above $75,000 per year. 3 Also, financial 
companies are among the largest sponsors of golf tournaments. For example, Citibank, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and UBS are sponsors of the Professional Golf Association 
(PGA) tour events. 
 Third, anecdotal evidence suggests that golf courses are natural venues for asset 
managers to socialize and interact with business partners. Peter Lynch, long-time manager 
of Fidelity Magellan Fund, recalls of his golf caddying experience: “Those years on the golf 
course were a great education, the next best thing to being on the floor of the exchange.” 
John Spooner, a Boston wealth manager, says that “The truth is a tremendous amount of 
business gets done on the golf course…You have a captive audience for five hours. Tongues 
get loosened with the sport and the camaraderie.”4  
 It is important to note that our focus is not on whether asset managers who golf 
make better investors, but rather on the importance of golf courses as social attractions 
                                            
3 http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article26338330.html.  
4 Simiarly, Rikus Delport, Editor of Finance Week magazine, states: "Golf is the one sport where talking 
business is not only accepted but encouraged. Few other sports allow the networking opportunities that golf 
provides. Not many sports allow one to spend five hours of 'captive time' with clients or colleagues in relaxed, 
beautiful surroundings".   
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that enhance the information flow of nearby asset managers.5 Also, the information 
advantages of these investors may not necessarily arise from private or insider information, 
although a number of recent SEC charges related to insider information exchange occurred 
on golf courses. 6  Instead, investors may use the information flow from their social 
interactions to learn before investing. The learning mechanism may amplify these 
information advantages, making investors more informed (Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2009). 
 Using a comprehensive database of 15,479 golf courses in the United States, we track 
the performance of institutional investors located close to “prestigious” golf courses.7 Our 
empirical strategy focuses on prestigious golf courses because these venues are more likely 
to attract business professionals from across the country and offer better opportunities for 
nearby investors to meet and socialize with them. Performance tests indicate that the 
investor’s distance to prestigious golf courses is a strong predictor of benchmark-adjusted 
and risk-adjusted portfolio returns. On average, institutional investors located close to 
prestigious golf courses (“close-to-golf” investors) outperform by approximately 0.49% per 
annum (market-adjusted returns) compared to their distant-to-golf counterparts. The 
results are similar using benchmark adjusted, factor model adjusted, and DGTW 
characteristics adjusted returns. This translates to an additional $2.5 million dollars for 
an institutional inves tor with $500 million assets under management.8  
                                            
5 Although this is an interesting research topic, data limitations make it is difficult to identify golfers among 
asset managers. 
6For example, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542276935, 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542670374, 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19665.pdf). 
7 In our main tests, a golf course is designated as ‘prestigious’ if its green fee is in the top decile of all courses 
in a comprehensive database provided by www.coursedatabase.com. 
8 In our sample of institutional investors, the median and the mean size of investor portfolio holdings are 
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 These findings are not due to differences in investor type (i.e. banks, insurance, 
pension funds etc.), investor styles (i.e., growth, growth & income, value), investor size 
(i.e. total assets under management), or institution age. To address reverse causality 
concerns, we exclude golf courses that were built after the beginning of our sample period 
(year 1991) in all of our analyses. This approach largely rules out the possibility that well-
performing institutional investors may attract the development of golf courses. Also, the 
inclusion of state fixed effects helps to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by 
unobserved state heterogeneity. 
 While this evidence supports our motivation that golf courses and country clubs 
foster social interaction, we recognize that other common environmental sources are likely 
at play. For example, close-to-golf investors located in a particular region may experience 
local media coverage that may provide valuable investment information. Alternatively, 
skilled investment managers may sort into geographical regions such as financial centers 
or wealthy areas based on ability.9 Such concerns are particularly tricky to address since 
golf course locations are static and investment companies rarely re-locate headquarters. 
 To address these concerns, we exploit two plausible sources of variation in the 
vibrancy of social activity around golf courses. First, we isolate golf clubs with 
reciprocal/open guest policies that allow course access to members from affiliated clubs. 
This increases opportunities for social interactions, attracting golfers and visitors from 
across the country. Ultra-exclusive country clubs and golf courses with fewer members 
have less opportunities to build social connections. Consistent with the sociability 
                                            
$437 million and $4.2 billion. 
9 Christofferson and Sarkissian (2009) find that mutual funds in financial centers tend to exhibit better 
performance. 
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hypothesis, the outperformance from our performance tests are mostly due to golf courses 
with reciprocal guest policies. 
 Second, we identify major golf tournaments (PGA championship and U.S. Open) 
that rotate locations each year.10 These events are likely to increase overall social activity 
around the golf course because the tournaments draw big crowds, increase golf awareness, 
and attract distant golfers. Our results show that investor performance spikes in the years 
when major championships are held within the state, particularly for investors located 
near prestigious golf courses. 
 To further establish a causal link, we exploit an exogenous feature that the 
opportunity to play golf is weather-dependent. We expect greater social interactions and 
information flow when good weather brings golfers and visitors on the greens, but recedes 
when bad weather sidelines play. We define good weather as periods of low precipitation 
since the opportunity to play golf is most affected by snow and rainfall.11 We find that the 
pattern of outperformance for close–to–golf investors accrues mostly during times of low 
precipitation, evaporating when the weather sidelines play. 
 There are a number of ways close-to-golf investors may achieve their superior 
performance. Using portfolio holdings from the 13F filings, we find that close-to-golf 
investors are more likely to exhibit portfolio characteristics that are consistent with active 
trading due to information advantages (i.e., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005; Yan and 
                                            
10 The Major Championships, often referred to as “the majors,” are the four most prestigious annual golf 
tournaments in the world: PGA Championship (U.S.), U.S. Open (U.S.), Masters Tournament (U.S.), and 
The Open Championship (U.K.). 
11 Our definition of good weather, measured by precipitation, is different than the cloud cover definition 
used in studies that examine weather-related mood on asset prices (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; 
Goetzmann, Kim, Kumar, and Wang, 2015). Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find that after controlling for 
sunshine, rain and snow are unrelated to market returns. 
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Zhang, 2009; Amihud and Goyenko, 2013). Their portfolios are more concentrated, 
turnover more frequently, and are more selective, exhibiting lower correlation with 
systematic risk factors (low portfolio R-square). On average, close-to-golf investors have 
7% more portfolio turnover, 10% more portfolio concentration, and 14% more portfolio 
selectivity compared to their distant-to-golf counterparts. The portfolios of nearby close-
to-golf investors also exhibit particularly high correlations in performance and portfolio 
strategies, suggesting that they likely trade on similar signals.  
 However, local information advantages are not driving our findings as our 
performance test results are relatively unchanged after excluding local stocks from 
investors’ portfolios. Rather, our tests reveal that on average close-to-golf investors tend 
to hold more distant stocks, particularly for investors near reciprocal/open guest policy 
golf courses and when major golf tournaments rotate to the state. This finding is consistent 
with our argument that close-to-golf investors may generate investment ideas from their 
social interactions with distant visitors. 
 We perform additional tests to ensure that our findings are robust. Our main results 
hold using various definitions of distance to prestigious golf courses and alternative 
classification of “prestigious” golf course based on rankings from Golflink.com.12 Our 
findings are also robust to alternative measures of distance to golf courses. We find no 
results in a placebo test using “non-prestigious” golf courses.13 At the stock level, we 
                                            
12 We select the top 20 ranked best state golf courses from http://www.golflink.com/top-golf-courses/. 
GolfLink's list of the Best Golf Courses details the top public and private golf courses in each state. It is 
calculated from the preferences of up to a million or more visitors to its website every month.  
13 Those golf courses are designated as not “prestigious” if their green fees are in the bottom decile in the 
comprehensive golf course database provided by www.coursedatabase.com. 
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calculate a close-to-golf weighted ownership measure for each stock. Calendar time 
portfolio tests reveal that a long-short portfolio based on the close-to-golf weighted 
ownership measure generates risk-adjusted excess returns of 5% (Carhart four-factor 
model) per year, confirming our institutional investor level findings. 
 Both our performance results and portfolio analysis tests suggest that close-to-golf 
investors are more informed. Therefore, their ownership may potentially affect stock-level 
information asymmetry. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that greater close-to-golf 
weighted ownership predicts higher probability of informed trading (PIN) and higher 
Amihud illiquidity. A one standard deviation increase in the ownership-weighted close-to-
golf measure increases stock PIN by 2% and Amihud illiquidity by 5% compared to the 
sample average, respectively. Overall, these stock level findings provide further support 
that close-to-golf investors have information advantages.  
 Our paper adds to a growing literature on the importance of social interaction for 
stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004) and portfolio choice (Hong, 
Kubik, and Stein, 2005; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Our study relates to Pool, 
Stoffman, and Yonker (2014), who find that mutual fund managers that are neighbors 
have more correlated trading patterns. Our study is among the first to emphasize the role 
of local amenities – golf courses and country clubs – in stimulating social activity and 
enhancing the performance of institutional investors. 
 We also contribute to a large literature on the behavior and performance institutional 
investors (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003). Lewellen (2011) 
finds that on average institutional investors do not outperform the market. However, 
careful analysis of trading information suggests certain types of institutional trades are 
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informed (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Baik, Kang, and Kim, 2011; Puckett and Yan, 2011). 
Our study shows that the better overall portfolio–level performance of institutional 
investors located close to prestigious golf courses is likely due to greater social vibrancy 
and better access to information. 
 We proceed by describing the data and the main variables in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the main investor level performance findings. Section 4 presents the identification 
strategies we use to test the sociability hypothesis. Section 5 studies portfolio 
characteristics and potential sources of information advantages of close-to-golf investors. 
Section 6 presents the stock level analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Data and Variables 
We collect the data used in this study from a variety of sources. Equity holdings data of 
institutional investors is obtained from Thomson 13F filings. The SEC requires that all 
institutional investment managers with investment discretion over $100 million in 13(f) 
securities report long holdings positions each quarter. Investor style (value, income & 
growth, growth) and investor types (banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
investment advisors, and other) are based on classifications available on Brian Bushee’s 
website.14 We collect information on the location (city, state, and zip code) of institutional 
investors from their 13F filings and the corresponding values of latitude and longitude are 
obtained from the Gazetteer Files of Census 2000. For our precipitation tests, we obtain 
precipitation conditions around golf courses using data from the National Climatic Data 
Center. We focus on the standardized precipitation index (SP01) which allows for 
                                            
14 The data are available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
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comparison between locations with markedly different climates because it adjusts for 
median local weather conditions.15 
 Stock return and accounting data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. We construct 
firm level variables including size, market-to-book, book leverage, profitability, cash 
holdings, ILLIQ, and stock return volatility. The probability of informed trading measure 
(PIN) measure is from Stephen Brown’s website.16 The PIN measure construction is 
described in Brown and Hillegeist (2007). Detailed descriptions of all the variables are 
provided in the Appendix.  
A. Measuring Portfolio Performance 
 We use a variety of techniques to evaluate investor portfolio performance in each 
quarter. We employ a calendar time portfolio approach by computing each quarter returns 
of institutional investor portfolios using their reported portfolio holdings at the end of the 
prior quarter. The portfolio is rebalanced at the end of every calendar quarter when 
holding information is freshly reported. Our first approach uses benchmark adjusted 
performance since institutional investors have different mandates and investment 
objectives. We benchmark against market returns and peer groups by calculating three 
benchmark-adjusted measures by subtracting the portfolio return from the 1.) CRSP 
value-weighted market return (market adjusted), 2.) median investor style return (investor 
style adjusted), 3.) median investor style-type return (investor style-type adjusted). 
 To measure risk-adjusted performance, we calculate portfolio alpha by estimating 
                                            
15 Full details of the construction of SP01 is available at 
ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/drd/divisional.README. 
16 The data are available at http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data. 
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rolling-window factor loadings over the prior 60 months for each investor portfolio. Then 
we subtract the portfolio return in excess of the risk free rate minus the factor returns 
multiplied by the estimated factor loadings based on the CAPM 1-factor model, the Fama-
French 3-factor model, and the Carhart 4-factor model. We also perform a characteristic 
risk-adjustment by subtracting the individual stock return from its DGTW benchmark 
return following the methodology developed in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
(1997). Full details of these calculation are provided in the Appendix. 
B. Measuring Portfolio Strategies 
 We calculate three types of portfolio strategies based on institutional investor‘s 
portfolio holdings. Throughout the study, we require each investor to have at least 20 
quarters of reporting data to accurately estimate these measures. 
1.) Portfolio churn rate captures how frequently stock positions rotate in the portfolio 
(Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005; Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti, 2013). If we denote the set 
of companies held by investor i by Q, the churn rate of investor i at quarter s is:   
, , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 ,
,
, , 1 , 1 , , ,
Δ
2
i j s j s i j s j s i j s j s
j Q
i s
i j s j s i j s j s
j Q
N P N P N P
ChurnRate N P N P
  

 

 
 


,  
where Pj,s and Ni,j,s are the price and number of shares of stock j held by investor i. 
2.) Portfolio concentration is the investor’s concentration ratio (Herfindahl) of its 
portfolio, which is similar to the concept developed in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005). If we denote the set of stocks held by investor i by Q and wi,j,t the fraction invested 
in stock j at time t, portfolio concentration is defined as: 
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3.) Portfolio selectivity follows the methodology introduced in Amihud and Goyenko 
(2013). In every quarter t, and for each institutional investor j, we calculate daily buy-
and-hold portfolio returns based on its previous quarter-end stock holdings. Then, for each 
investor-quarter (j, t), we compute the 2,j tR from the following Carhart 4-factor regression: 
, ,( )j s s j j s s j S j S j S j sr rf α β MKT rf s SMB h HML uUMD ε s Quarter t          
where rj,s is the daily portfolio return of investor j on date s.17 Then, for investor-quarter 
(j, t), we define the portfolio selectivity at the investor level as: 
2
, ,1j t j tPortfolio Selectivity R  . 
 For our later tests, we use a measure of how geographically distant firms in an 
investor’s portfolio are located from the investor’s headquarter. We calculate a total 
portfolio measure of the weighted average distance between the institutional investor and 
its portfolio holdings. If we denote the set of stocks held by investor i by Q and wi,j,t to be 
the fraction of investor i invested in stock j, the portfolio distance is defined as: 
   , , 3963 * arccos( sin( )sin( ) cos( )cos( )cos( ))i,t i j t i j i j i j
j Q
Portfolio Distance w lat lat lat lat lon lon

  
 where (lati, loni), (latj, lonj) are the (latitude, longitude) for investor i and stock j in radian 
degrees. 
 
                                            
17 The independent variables include the market return minus the risk-free rate (MKTs-rfs), the return 
difference between small and large capitalization stocks (SMBs), the return difference between high and low 
book-to-market stocks (HMLs), and the return difference between stocks with high and low past returns 
(UMDs). The data for the risk-free rate, market return, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained from Kenneth 
French’s website. 
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C. Measuring Closeness to Prestigious Golf Courses  
 We obtain data on the universe of U.S. golf courses from the golf course database 
provided by www.coursedatabase.com. The database covers 15,479 US golf courses (last 
updated on January 2013) with detailed information on the zip codes, guest policy, build 
year, and green fees. We focus on established golf courses that are built before 1991. We 
rank the universe of golf courses by their green fees and select the top decile of golf courses 
as the set of prestigious golf courses.  
 Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of prestigious golf courses, average green fees, 
and average build year by state. There are 40 states that pass the build year and green 
fee screens. Florida has the most golf courses classified as prestigious (121 total), while 
New Hampshire and West Virginia have the fewest (1 total). We address the issue of 
heterogeneous golf course distribution in our close-to-golf measure below. 
 For each institutional investor, we first calculate a measure of distance-to-golf course 
as the average geographical distance between the investor and the selected golf courses in 
the same state. As states vary in size and distribution of investors, we standardize the 
distance-to-golf measure by dividing by the value of state median distance-to-golf. This 
simple standardization sets the median distance-to-golf value equal to 1. Since we are 
interested in how close an investors is to golf courses, our measure is: 
Close-to-golf = 1 – standardized distance-to-golf.  
 We subtract standardized distance-to-golf measure from 1 so that that median close-
to-golf measure is equal to 0, as seen in Panel B of Table I. We report the summary 
statistics of the other main variables in the same panel. For each variable, we report the 
mean, the median, and the standard deviation. The sample includes 90964 investor-quarter 
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observations and 71051 firm-year observations. The median and the average size of 
investor portfolio holdings are $437 million and $4.2 billion. On average, the raw portfolio 
return of investors is 2.48% per quarter, and the DGTW characteristics adjusted return 
is 0.18% per quarter. The CAPM 1-factor (Fama-French 3-factor, Carhart 4-factor) 
portfolio alpha is 0.42% (0.17%, 0.19%) per quarter. These numbers are largely consistent 
with the figures reported by Lewellen (2011).18  
 We construct the close-to-golf measure as a relative within state measure because 
our primarily concern is with the large differences in geographic size across states and the 
distribution of investors across the country. However, this choice represents a trade-off. 
While the standardization within state addresses this issue, it may not reflect actual 
distance to golf courses experienced by investors. Additionally, there is a concern that 
using the top decile of green fees may be too simplistic and not entirely capture the quality 
of a golf course.  
 In our robustness tests, we construct three additional close-to-golf measures to 
address these concerns. First, we construct a non-standardized distance-to-golf measure. 
Second, we create a measure based on the number of prestigious golf courses within a 100 
mile radius of the investors. Third, we re-estimate our main tests using state-level golf 
course rankings from Golflink.com for all 50 states. Our main findings in the subsequent 
sections are robust to these three alternative measures. We discussed the details of these 
tests in Section 5 and report the full results in the Internet Appendix, Tables A3 and A4. 
                                            
18 Our numbers are in general higher than the ones reported in Lewellen (2011). The reason is that our 
sample period is from 1991-2011, while Lewellen (2011) uses a sample period of 1980-2007.  
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3 Investor Level Portfolio Performance 
We test our main hypothesis that close-to-golf investors experience better performance. 
To measure excess returns, we estimate benchmark- and risk- adjusted returns to capture 
differences in investment mandates and risk taking behavior. Since investor level 
benchmarks are not publicly available, we construct three benchmark adjustments to 
ensure our findings are robust. We use a simple market-adjustment for ease of 
interpretation and two peer adjustments (i.e., style-adjusted and style-type adjusted) to 
compare the investor’s performance against its cohort, effectively creating a relative 
performance measure. We adjust for risk using DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns and 
estimate portfolio alphas based on the CAPM, Fama-French 3 factor, and Carhart 4 factor 
risk models as described in Section 2. We start by conducting univariate sorts and follow 
up with multivariate analysis. 
 Figure 1 presents sub-sample (below and above median close-to-golf) averages of the 
excess return measures. Institutional investors that are located closer to prestigious golf 
courses (i.e. above the median level) earn higher excess returns than their below median 
counterparts across both benchmark-, risk-, and characteristics-adjusted return measures. 
All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level using both t-test and Wilcoxon 
test and reported in Panel C of Table I. On average, institutional investors located close 
to prestigious golf courses outperform by approximately 0.49% per annum (market-
adjusted returns) compared to their distant-to-golf counterparts. This translates to an 
additional $2.5 million dollars for an institutional investor with a size of $500 million 
assets under management.  
15 
 
 While the univariate analysis is simple and easy to interpret, we wish to control for 
additional investor characteristics. Therefore we estimate the following baseline panel 
regression: 
, , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tPortfolioExcessReturn α β Close to Golf δ X ε         . 
 Close-to-golfi,t-1 is the close-to-golf measure and Xi,t-1 is a vector representing total 
equity assets under management and institution age. We include four fixed effects: year-
quarter fixed effects to capture unobservable time-related heterogeneity, state fixed effects 
to capture time-invariant state characteristics, institution type fixed effects (i.e. bank, 
insurance, investment companies, investment advisors, and others) and investor style fixed 
effects (i.e. value, growth & income, growth). Standard errors are clustered by institutional 
investor. Our results are robust to double clustering standard errors by both investor and 
time, which we report in the Internet Appendix Table A1. 
 Table II reports the main findings. Panel A shows that the close-to-golf measure 
significantly predicts future benchmark-adjusted returns. The parameter estimate on the 
close-to-golf measure is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across all three 
benchmark-adjusted return measures. The results remain with the inclusion of state fixed 
effects in columns (2), (4), and (6), suggesting that unobservable state heterogeneity is 
not behind our findings. Based on the average (median) size of institutional investors in 
our sample, a one standard deviation increase is associated with more than $10 ($1.2) 
million dollars of excess returns per year. These findings imply that investors located close-
to-golf courses tend to outperform their peers after controlling investor type (i.e. bank, 
insurance, investment companies, etc.) or investor characteristics related to size (AUM) 
or age. 
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 Panel B reports risk- or characteristic- adjusted returns results from the same 
regression specification above. The parameter estimate on the close-to-golf measure 
remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across all risk-adjustments 
and with the inclusion of state fixed effects in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8).19 These 
findings suggest that the superior performance of close-to-golf investors is not due to 
differences in risk-taking. As before, the regressions include investor and style fixed effects, 
suggesting that differences across investor types or invest style are not behind our findings. 
 In sum, our univariate sorts and multivariate regression produce the similar 
conclusion that close–to–golf investors significantly outperform their counterparts, both 
on a benchmark- and risk- adjusted basis. Robustness tests using alternative measures of 
distance to golf courses are discussed in full detail in Section 5 and presented in the 
Internet Appendix.  
4 Identification: Sociability Hypothesis 
Our main hypothesis is that sociability improves the dissemination and flow of information, 
potentially improving portfolio decisions. We ideally wish to capture actual conversations 
and communication, but unfortunately such social interaction is difficult to observe. This 
raises data mining concerns and makes it easy to dismiss our results as spurious 
correlations. Therefore, we search for plausible exogenous variation in social activity 
around golf courses to test our sociability hypothesis. 
 To identify the sociability hypothesis, we employ three distinct tests based on golf 
                                            
19 It is worth discussing that our results indicate that portfolio performance decreases with investor size and 
institution age. This is consistent with diminishing marginal returns to asset size, perhaps through the 
mechanisms described in Berk and Green (2004) and Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004). 
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course guest policy, rotation of major golf tournaments, and exogenous changes in 
precipitation. These tests are important because they are our primary approach to rule 
out the possibility that local regional characteristics (i.e., financial centers, population 
characteristics, local income, etc.) are behind our results. 
A. Guest Policy 
 We exploit variation in a country club’s reciprocity arrangement which is a guest 
policy that allows entry to members of affiliated clubs. Guest policies that are open or 
reciprocal allow for more visitors, increasing the potential for social interactions, all else 
equal.20 We argue that these country clubs are more likely to be socially vibrant, attracting 
visitors from across the country. Additionally, we check and find that these reciprocal and 
open policy golf course are randomly distributed across the country, suggesting that local 
effects are likely not determining guest policy choice. We implement this test by re-
calculating the close-to-golf measure separately for reciprocal-policy clubs and closed-
policy clubs that are in the prestigious golf club sample. Then, we re-estimate the 
regression specification in Table II using these alternative definitions.  
 Panel A of Table III presents the results of our guest policy test. We find a 
significantly stronger relation between performance and our close-to-golf measure for 
reciprocal-policy golf courses compared to closed-policy golf courses. The coefficient 
estimates on close-to-golf measure is more than twice as large for reciprocal-policy golf 
course (0.148, t= 3.94) than closed-policy courses (0.063, t= 2.28) using market-adjusted 
returns. The difference in coefficient estimates is statistically significant using Chi-square 
                                            
20 In our sample of selected golf courses, 60% of the courses have reciprocal/open guest policy and the rest 
40% have closed guest policy.  
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test (5.17**). Columns (3)-(8) show that the patterns are statistically significant for style-, 
style and type-, and DGTW- adjusted returns, suggesting that the results are robust to 
alternative measures of performance. The differences in coefficients are also statistically 
significant across all specifications using Chi-square tests.  
 This evidence supports the hypothesis that social vibrancy may be a source of the 
portfolio performance outcomes we find in Section 3. By exploiting plausible cross-
sectional variation across our sample of ‘prestigious’ golf courses, we find that it is not the 
proximity to any prestigious golf and country clubs, but to ones that are likely to more 
social activity. We provide additional supporting evidence on the sociability channel in 
Section 5, where we find no results from a placebo test that uses ‘non-prestigious’ golf 
courses.  These golf course are unlikely to attract distant golfers and visitors and therefore 
are unlikely to provide the benefits of sociability to nearby investors. We use the variation 
in guest policy in our later tests to help with our identification strategies, but we recognize 
its limitations make it difficult to completely rule-out omitted variables relating to regional 
characteristics. Therefore, in our subsequent tests, we identify plausible exogenous shocks 
to social activity to help address these omitted variable concerns.  
B. Major Championships 
 We design a quasi-natural experiment based on the annual rotation of premier golf 
tournaments, commonly known as Major Championships or simply ‘Majors.’ Two of the 
four annual ‘Majors’ in professional golf change locations each year. Specifically, the U.S. 
Open, hosted by the United States Golf Association, and the PGA Championship, hosted 
by the Professional Golfers' Association of America, are played at various locations in the 
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United States. ‘Majors’ draw big crowds and attract both local and distant golfers. These 
tournaments tend to increase awareness and may inspire less active players to play a round 
of golf. What is important for our identification strategy is that these events increase 
overall social activity around golf and country clubs. As an example, the recent 2015 U.S. 
Open in University Place, Washington attracted over 270,000 outside visitors among 
which 75% earned an average wage above $75,000 per year.21 
 While the selection of tournament location is not random, it is determined many 
years in advance. For example, the site for the 2022 PGA Championship (Bedminster, 
New Jersey) was already announced in 2015. This alleviates concerns that the tournament 
location is confounded with contemporaneous regional economic conditions that could 
potentially affect investor performance. The tournaments also rotate around many states 
alleviating concerns that we only identify a small subset of states.22 
 To test the impact of ‘Majors,’ we define a dummy variable Championship Dummy 
equal to 1 if the state hosts a “U.S. Open” or “PGA Championship” in the year and 0 
otherwise. We use the same regression specification as in Table III, but include the 
Championship dummy variable and the interaction between the close-to-golf and the 
championship dummy.  
 Panel B of Table III presents results using style-adjusted returns. Column (1) shows 
that the variable of interest – the interaction term of close-to-golf  Championship 
Dummy – is a positive and statistically significantly relates to style-adjusted returns. In 
this specification, the coefficient estimate on the close-to-golf measure remains positive 
                                            
21 http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article26338330.html.  
22  The historical locations of PGA Championship and U.S. Open can be found at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGA_Championship, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Open_(golf). 
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and statistically significant suggesting that close-to-golf investors on average earn higher 
returns, but that performance spikes during the years when a ‘Major’ rotates to an 
investor’s home state. 
 We incorporate our previous guest policy analysis and find that the effects of ‘Major’ 
championships are mostly concentrated in reciprocal guest policy clubs in Column (2) 
rather than closed policy clubs in Column (3). The coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term of close-to-golf  Championship Dummy is nearly twice as large for reciprocal policy 
courses (0.267, t=3.34) compared to closed policy courses (0.143, t=2.25).  The differences 
are more pronounced using DGTW characteristics adjusted portfolio returns in Columns 
(5) and (6). Column (6) shows that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is 
insignificant for the close policy course specification. 
 Our main inferences remain unchanged using an alternative econometric specification 
that includes investor fixed effects, creating a difference-in-difference test. This compares 
the treated club against itself (investor fixed effect), while non-treated clubs act as a 
control group. We report these results in the Internet Appendix, Table A2. It is interesting 
to note that Championship Dummy is positive and statistically significant across all six 
columns. This implies an overall level effect for all investors in the state during the year 
of the ‘Major.’ One explanation is that these tournaments stimulate social activity across 
the state leading to benefits for all investors. 
C. Precipitation Around Golf Courses 
 The evidence presented thus far suggests that the benefits of sociability are a likely 
source of the superior performance of close-to-golf investors. However, there are plausible 
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alternative interpretations of our results. For example, the location of close-to-golf 
investors may be correlated with better local information sources such as local media 
coverage, journalist, and other financial intermediaries that produce valuable information. 
These types of local effects are difficult to dismiss because the location of both golf courses 
and institutional investor headquarters are static. 
 We address these concerns and other alternatives explanations relating to regional 
effects by exploiting the fact that golf is a weather-dependent outdoor activity. Poor 
weather conditions such as rainfall and snow keeps golfers off the greens, lowering social 
activity around golf courses. If our sociability hypothesis is correct, investor performance 
will also vary with the time-series variation in social activity, as proxy by weather. To test 
this idea, we gather precipitation data from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). 
Precipitation is measured using the standardized precipitation index (SP01) designed to 
allow for comparison across locations with markedly different climates conditions.  
 To implement this causality test, we estimate performance regressions similar to the 
specification in Table II. We additionally include a weather dummy variable to indicate 
quarters when precipitation is low, representing ‘good’ weather for social activity, and an 
interaction term – close-to-golf measure  Good Weather Dummy – which tests how the 
performance of close-to-golf investors varies with precipitation conditions around golf 
courses.. We define the “Good Weather Dummy I” equal to one if the standardized 
precipitation index is below the sample median, and “Good Weather Dummy II” equal to 
one if the standardized precipitation index is below the state median.  
 The results in Table IV show that the better performance of close-to-golf investors 
concentrates during times when precipitation is low. Using market-adjusted returns, 
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Column (1) shows that the parameter estimate on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant (0.237, t=4.85), while the parameter estimate on close-to-golf loses 
statistical significance (0.011, t=0.29). Column (2) shows that the results are nearly 
identical using our second weather variable, “Good Weather Dummy II.” The results 
remain statistically significant at better than the 1% level using style-, style & type-, and 
DGTW- adjusted returns in the remaining columns (3) to (8). The results are also 
similar using risk-adjusted returns, which we report in Internet Appendix Table A6, Panel 
B. 
 The inclusion of time fixed effects and investor style and type fixed effects in the 
regressions suggest that investor types and styles are not behind our findings. They also 
include state fixed effects, ruling out the possibility that these findings are due to 
differences across states. Using differences in guest policies, we find that the precipitation 
effects are stronger for open policy courses, consistent with our earlier findings. We report 
these results in Internet Appendix, Table A6. As a robustness test, we estimate a more 
stringent alternative econometric specifications of this regression by including investor 
fixed effects. Our findings continue to hold in this difference-in-difference test, which we 
present in the Internet Appendix, Table A2. 
 This test is perhaps our most important evidence supporting the sociability 
hypothesis since it is difficult to find alternative reasons for why the performance of close-
to-golf institutional investors rises and falls with precipitation around the golf course. One 
possible story is that this effect may relate to weather-induced mood effects (Hirshleifer 
and Shumway, 2003) in institutional investors (Goetzmann et al., 2015). However, we 
believe this is unlikely for the following reasons. First, our weather definition is based on 
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precipitation, which is different than the cloud-cover definition used in weather-induced 
mood studies. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) shows that their findings are related to 
sunshine, and importantly, unrelated to rainfall and snow. Second, Goetzmann et al. (2015) 
show that while cloud-cover affects buy-sell trading behavior, it does not have permanent 
return effects. 
5 Portfolio Strategy and Information Advantage 
The pattern of superior performance of close-to-golf investors that we document in the 
previous section raises the question as to the source of this advantage. Close-to-golf 
investors may achieve these outcomes in a number of different ways. For example, investors 
may possess skilled trading ability (Puckett and Yan, 2011) or they may focus their 
portfolios in their areas of expertise. In this section, we carefully examine the portfolio 
characteristics of close-to-golf investors to potentially gain insights on the source of their 
information advantages. 
A. Portfolio Strategies 
 Using portfolio holdings from the 13F filings, we calculate portfolio characteristics 
that are associated with better performance as documented in the prior literature: churn 
rates, portfolio concentration, and portfolio selectivity. The full details of variable 
construction are discussed in Section II.  
 We start by presenting univariate sorts, splitting institutional investors on the median 
close-to-golf measure. Figure II presents averages of the three portfolio strategy measures 
for the above and below median close-to-golf investor groups. The above median group of 
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close-to-golf institutional investors have 10% greater portfolio concentration (4.120 vs. 
3.736), 14% greater portfolio selectivity (0.139 vs. 0.122), and 7% higher churn rates (0.571 
vs. 0.534) than their more distant to golf counterparts. Panel C of Table I shows that all 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level using both t-test and Wilcoxon tests. 
These results are consistent with close-to-golf investors possessing information advantages 
since holding more concentrated portfolios, more selective portfolios, and turning over 
their portfolios more frequently are related to informed trading behavior. 
 To test whether the univariate patterns hold in a multivariate setting, we estimate 
the following baseline panel regression: 
, , 1 , 1 ,Close-to-Golfi t i t i t i tPortfolioStrategy α β δ X ε        
 Portfolio strategy measures include investor portfolio churn rate, portfolio 
concentration, and portfolio selectivity. Close-to-golfi,t-1 is the close-to-golf measure defined 
in Section 2 and Xi,t-1 is a vector representing total equity assets under management and 
institution age. As before, we include four fixed effects in our regression specifications: 
year-quarter fixed effects, state fixed effects, institution type fixed effects (i.e. bank, 
insurance, investment companies, investment advisors, and others), and investor style 
fixed effects (value, growth & income, growth). Standard errors are clustered by 
institutional investor. 
 The results in Table V show that the patterns from the univariate sorts are also 
present in the multivariate setting. Close-to-golf institutional investors have statistically 
significantly higher churn rates, greater concentration, and greater portfolio selectivity. 
The inclusion of institution type and investor style fixed effects suggest that our results 
are not related to these differences across investors, and our results are similar and in 
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some cases stronger with the inclusion of state fixed effects in columns (2), (4), and (6). 
The regressions results also show that these portfolio strategies tend to decrease in investor 
size and age. This points to the possibility that as institutional investors gain more assets 
under management, it becomes more difficult to implement these strategies. 
 In sum, our analysis suggests that on average, close-to-golf investors exhibit portfolio 
characteristics that associated with superior performance in the prior literature. This 
implies that these investors are likely informed. In this next section, we consider whether 
the information is local or distant in nature. 
B. Ruling-out Local Information Advantages 
 We examine the possibility that our results are driven by the local holdings advantage 
documented in Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010). This test is important to help shed light on 
the source of the information advantage of close-to-golf investors. Our sociability 
hypothesis proposes that prestigious golf courses attract visitors from across the country, 
generating information flow of a distant nature. This implies two predictions. First, we 
expect that the superior performance of close-to-golf investors is not likely to be generated 
from local stocks. Second, if their information flow is from outside the local area, we would 
expect that close-to-golf investors are more likely to hold distant stocks 
 To test these predictions, we first re-examine our performance results by excluding 
all local stocks in the portfolio using the same regression specifications in Table II. We 
exclude a ‘local’ stock from the investor’s portfolio either if the distance between the 
institutional investor’s location and the firm’s headquarter is less than 250 miles or if the 
institutional investor and firm are located in the same state.  
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 Panel A of Table VI shows that there remains a statistically significant relation 
between the close-to-golf measure and market adjust returns after excluding all local 
stocks. Column (1) shows that the parameter estimate on the close-to-golf measure (0.137, 
t=4.00) is similar to the one using all stocks in Column (1) in Table II (0.125, t=3.70). 
This implies that the holdings of local stocks are not the primary source of better 
performance by close-to-golf investors. The results are relatively unchanged with the 
inclusion of state fixed effects in Column (2), and the parameter estimates on the close-
to-golf measure are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level using style-adjusted 
returns in Columns (3) and (4), and style and type adjusted returns in Columns (5) and 
(6).  
 We find that the portfolio strategy results are also similar after excluding all local 
stocks from investor portfolios. Panel B of Table VI presents the results using the same 
portfolio strategy regression specifications used in Table V. Columns (1) shows that the 
relation between churn rates and the close-to-golf measures is positive and statistically 
significant, with parameter estimates (0.032, t=3.65) that are similar to the finding using 
all stocks in Column (1) of Table V (0.032, t=3.66). The inclusion of state fixed effects in 
Column (2) does not affect the results. The portfolio concentration test in Columns (3) 
and (4) show much stronger effects after the exclusion of local stocks. While these findings 
are not directly comparable to our earlier results due to the mechanical difference in 
portfolio composition, the coefficient estimate on the close-to-golf measure remains 
positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, suggesting that the 
exclusion of local stocks does not change our original inferences. Likewise, our findings 
from the portfolio selectivity tests in Columns (5) and (6) are also consistent with the 
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evidence presented in Table V. 
 For our second test, we calculate the average geographic distance between the 
investor’s headquarter and the firm’s headquarter for all the stocks in the portfolio. We 
call the logarithm of this measure portfolio distance. The details of the variable 
construction are summarized in the Appendix. We test if this distance relates to our close-
to-golf measure using the following regression:  
, , 1 , 1 ,Close-to-Golfi t i t i t i tPortfolioDistance α β δ X ε        
 where close-to-golfi,t-1 is the close-to-golf measure defined in Section 2 and Xi,t-1 is a 
vector representing total equity assets under management and institution age. As before, 
we include four fixed effects in our regression specifications: year-quarter fixed effects, 
state fixed effects, institution type fixed effects (i.e. bank, insurance, investment companies, 
investment advisors, and others), and investor style fixed effects (value, growth & income, 
growth). Standard errors are clustered by institutional investor. 
 Table VII presents the tests using our portfolio distance measure. Column (1) shows 
that close-to-golf investors have greater portfolio distance. The coefficient estimate on the 
close-to-golf measure is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and remain 
significant with the inclusion of state fixed effects in Column (2). Columns (6) and (7) 
show that the results are stronger after excluding local stocks from the portfolio distance 
calculations. These findings suggest that close-to-golf investor are more likely to hold 
distant stocks, consistent with the idea that their information flow may be of a distant 
nature. 
 Next, we search for additional supporting evidence that the holding of distant stocks 
relates to social interactions with distant visitors. While we do not observe actual social 
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interactions, we employ the approach in our earlier identification tests that more distant 
visitors are more likely to visit golf courses with reciprocal policies and during times when 
Major Championships rotate into the state. 
 Consistent with the possibility of increased social interactions with distant visitors, 
Column (3) shows that portfolio distance increases during the years when Majors rotate 
into the state. The interaction term close-to-golf  Championship Dummy is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that the average portfolio distance of close-to-golf 
investors increases during these years.  Column (4) show that while the close-to-golf 
measure constructed from reciprocal golf courses relates to greater portfolio distance, the 
parameter estimate on the close-to-golf measure for closed golf course is not statistically 
significant (Column (5)). The Chi-square test of the differences in the two parameter 
estimates are statistically significant (13.07***). The results are similar when we repeat 
these tests using only non-local stocks to calculate portfolio distance in Columns (8)-(10). 
 This set of results provides evidence that likely rules-out local information advantages 
as the source of better performance of close-to-golf investors. First, we find that the better 
investment performance of close-to-golf investors is not due to local stocks. They also tend 
to hold more distantly located stocks, particularly around more socially vibrant golf 
courses (i.e. open course policy) and during times of greater social activity (i.e. Major 
championships). 
C. Co-movement with Nearby Close-to-Golf Investors 
 Investors located near each other may share similar investment signals and have 
access to similar information flow. This could occur if they communicate with the same 
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sources or socialize with each other. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) show 
that portfolios of mutual fund managers in the same city exhibit return co-movement, 
while  Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2014) find that the co-movement is even greater 
amongst neighbors. Since investors located close to prestigious golf courses share similar 
benefits from sociability, their portfolio performance and strategies are also likely to 
exhibit particularly high correlations. 
 We examine how each investor’s return and portfolio strategy co-moves with their 
geographically proximate neighbors, and whether these patterns are affected by the close-
to-golf measure. For each institutional investor, we identify nearby investors as all the 
other investors that are located within 50 miles from the investor. Then, we calculate the 
average performance measures and average portfolio strategies of all nearby investors. All 
performance measures are either benchmark- or risk- adjusted to control for 
contemporaneous systematic trends. 
 We estimate a panel regression of portfolio return/strategy on the average of the 
nearby investors’ return/strategy. The regressions include year-quarter fixed effects to 
capture additional time-varying systematic macro conditions. Standard errors are 
clustered by investor. The key variable of interest is the interaction term between the 
nearby return (nearby strategy) with the close-to-golf measure. 
 Panel A of Table VIII presents the results of the return co-movement tests. Column 
(1) shows that an investor’s style-adjusted portfolio return significantly co-moves with its 
local neighbors’ benchmark-adjusted returns, consistent with the findings in Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein (2005). The patterns are similar using style- and type- return adjustment 
(Column 3) or DGTW return adjustment (Column 5). Our focus is on the interaction 
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term - nearby return  close-to-golf measure - which we include in Columns (2), (4) and 
(6).  The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant 
at better than the 1% level across all three return adjustments, implying that the co-
movement of close-to-golf investors with their nearby investor is 22% to 46% greater that 
their distant-to-golf counterparts. We interpret this evidence to support our hypothesis 
that prestigious golf courses stimulates the social vibrancy in the local area, increasing 
the sociability of nearby investors. 
 Panel B of Table VIII presents portfolio strategy results using the same regression 
specification. Columns (1), (3), and (6) show that an investor’s portfolio strategy is 
correlated with nearby investors. The interaction term between the nearby strategy and 
the close-to-golf measure is also positive and statistically significant across all three 
portfolio strategies, suggesting that correlations increase particularly when investors are 
located near prestigious golf courses. In particular, portfolio concentration is nearly twice 
as correlated with nearby investors if investors are located near prestigious golf courses. 
 The results of the return correlation and strategy correlation tests lend support to 
our sociability hypothesis. We find that investors located near to prestigious golf courses 
exhibit high correlations with nearby investors that exceed the location effects documented 
in previous literature. We argue that this evidence is consistent with the greater effects of 
social activity around prestigious golf courses.  
D. Alternative Measures of Distance and Identification of Prestigious Golf 
Courses  
 We construct our primary close-to-golf measure as a relative within state measure 
due to the concern that state-level differences may drive our results. While this relative 
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measure helps to address this particular issue, it may not reflect the actual distance to 
the golf course as experienced by investors. 
 To insure that our results are robust to the measurement of distance, we construct 
two alternative measures using different distance calculations. First, we create an 
unstandardized value of the close-to-golf measure by using the negative value of the 
logarithm of the average distance to prestigious golf courses in each state. We find that 
the investment performance and portfolio strategy results are unchanged using this 
alternative measure. We present these results in the Internet Appendix: Table A3. 
 Another potential concern with measuring distance within state is that certain 
investor may be located near state borders and may conveniently access nearby golf 
courses in other states. This makes our within state assumption potentially restrictive and 
noisy. Therefore, we create a measure based on the number of prestigious golf course 
within a 100 mile radius of the investors. We find that our main inferences are unchanged 
using this measure. The full results are available in the Internet Appendix: Table A3. 
 Next, we re-create our close-to-golf measure using an alternative definition of 
‘prestigious’ golf courses. While the benefit of using the top decile green cut-off is in its 
simplicity, green fees do not perfectly capture golf course quality. Also, green fees may be 
associated with local regional wealth, which may be potentially correlate with investor 
performance. Our alternative definition of ‘prestigious’ golf courses uses the top 20 best 
golf courses ranked within each state by Golflink.com. The main findings from our investor 
performance and portfolio strategy tests are quantitatively similar using the Golflink.com 
based measure. The full results are available in the Internet Appendix: Table A4. 
 As a second approach to test the validity of our use of ‘prestigious’ golf courses, we 
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expect that the closeness to non-prestigious golf courses is likely to have no effect on 
institutional investors’ portfolio performance and strategies. These golf courses are 
unlikely to attract distant golfers and visitors especially business professionals with high 
net worths, reducing the sociability benefits to nearby investors. To identify non-
prestigious courses, we use golf courses in the bottom decile of green fees, and re-estimate 
our main analysis. Indeed, we find no relation between nearness to these golf courses and 
investor performance and portfolio strategies. We report the full set of results in the 
Internet Appendix: Table A5. 
6 Stock Level Analysis 
Our main evidence suggests that close-to-golf investors possess information advantages in 
the stocks they own. While the analysis in previous sections focuses along the institutional 
investor dimension, in this section, we examine performance on the stock dimension by 
calculating a weighted average close-to-golf measure based on institutional investors’ 
holdings for each stock. For each stock-quarter, we create a close-to-golf weighted 
ownership measure calculated as follows: 
Q
, , , , ,
j Q
=i t i j t i j tClose - to - golf weighted Ownership w Close - to - golf

 , 
 where for stock i at time t, wi,j,t represents the percentage ownership by investor j , 
close-to-golf represents the close-to-golf measure of investor j, and Q represents the set of 
all institutional investors holding the stock. To ensure that our measure does not reflect 
the information advantages inherent in local institutional ownership, we create an 
alternative measure that excludes all local institutional investor holdings. 
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 Also, we conduct stock level analysis to explore the link between ownership by close-
to-golf investors and information asymmetry. If the information advantages of close-to-
golf investors are large enough, it may potentially effect the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) and stock liquidity. 
A. Close-to-golf Return Predictability 
 First, we examine whether our performance results are also present when we form 
calendar time portfolios at the stock-level based on holdings of close-to-golf investors. At 
the beginning of each month from January 1991 to December 2011, stocks are sorted into 
quintiles based on the previous quarter-end close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. 
Portfolio 1 has the lowest close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. Portfolio 5 has the 
highest close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. Equally-weighted returns for the five 
portfolios are calculated over the month. For each portfolio, we report the raw average 
portfolio return, the abnormal return (i.e., alpha) from the CAPM 1-factor (market factor) 
model, the alpha from the Fama-French 3-factor (market factor, SMB, HML) model, and 
the alpha from the Carhart 4-factor (market factor, SMB, HML, and momentum factor) 
model. “Long Portfolio 5 & Short Portfolio 1” is the difference in the returns between the 
highest and lowest close-to-golf portfolios. 
 Table IX presents the results of the portfolio sorts. Panel A shows that across all four 
return measures, the highest close-to-golf weighted ownership measure portfolio (Portfolio 
5) outperforms its lowest counterpart. The long-short portfolio return is positive and 
statistically significant for all return measures, generating a monthly alpha of 0.45% (t= 
3.16) using the Carhart 4-factor model.  
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 Panel B shows that the results are similar when we exclude local institutional 
investors from the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. In this panel, we re-calculate 
the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure as before but exclude all local institutional 
investors. We define local investors as any investor located in the same state or within 250 
miles of the firm’s headquarter. The results show that the long-short portfolio returns 
continue to generate positive and statistically significant alphas with a monthly alpha of 
0.37% (t=2.74) using the Carhart 4-factor model. 
 In sum, these results support our investor level findings that close-to-golf investors 
possess information advantages. It also suggests that the aggregation of close-to-golf 
investors’ holdings may provide valuable trading signals. 
B. Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
 Next, we examine whether ownership by close-to-golf investors affects the probability 
of informed trading measure (PIN) at the stock level. We estimate panel regressions of 
PIN on the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure using the following equation: 
1 1, , - , - ,PINi t i t i t i tα β Close - to -Golf weighted Ownership δ X ε       
where Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm and stock characteristics including firm size, market-to-
book, book leverage, profitability, cash holding, past stock return, and return volatility. 
The regressions include institutional ownership and institutional investor turnover so that 
the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure does not simply reflect institutional 
ownership or investor horizon. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. 
 Table X presents regression results using the PIN measure. The first column shows 
that the parameter estimate (0.034***, t=6.94) on the close-to-golf weighted ownership 
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measure is significantly and positively related to PIN. One standard deviation increase in 
close-to-golf increase the stock PIN by 2% relative to the sample average. The inclusion 
of state fixed effects in column (2) and firm fixed effects in column (3) does not materially 
change the parameter estimate. The next three columns report results using the non-local 
close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. We find similar results across these 
specifications. 
 We note that the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure does not simply reflect 
ownership by institutional investors. For example, Column (1) shows negative and 
statistically significant parameter estimates on institutional ownership (–0.082***, t=– 
32.40). This is directionally opposite to the parameter estimate on the close-to-golf 
weighted ownership measure as we discuss above. 
C. Amihud Illiquidity 
 Liquidity also reflects information asymmetry. Greater information asymmetry 
among investors will cause greater stock illiquidity, all else equal. We explore whether the 
close-to-golf weighted ownership measure relates to stock-level liquidity by estimating the 
same regression model in the PIN analysis, using the ILLIQ measure developed in Amihud 
(2002).  
 Table XI shows that the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure significantly affects 
liquidity. A one standard deviation increase in the close-to-golf measure increases the stock 
illiquidity by 5% relative to the sample average. The parameter estimate remains 
statistically significant with the inclusion of state fixed effects in column (2) and firm fixed 
effects in column (3). The results do not materially change using the non-local holdings-
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weight measure reported in Columns (4)-(6). 
 To establish a causal relation, we employ precipitation levels around golf courses to 
instrument for the close-to-golf weighted ownership and then link it to stock liquidity in 
an instrumental variables regression. In particular, we perform an analysis at the firm-
investor state level. In each quarter, for every stock i and State J pair, we calculate the 
close-to-golf weighted ownership among all investors that are located in State J.  Then, 
we regress the weighted close-to-golf on the average precipitation among all the selected 
golf courses in State J. We verify the relevance of the instrument using the following 
equation: 
, , , , -1 ,i J t J t i t i tClose -to-Golf weighted Ownership α β Golf CoursePrecipitation δ X ε      . 
 Panel A of Table XII presents the results.23 We find that the average precipitation 
among the selected golf courses is a strong predictor of the close-to-golf weighted 
ownership measure. The coefficient estimates are positive and statistically significant 
across all specifications. Next, we use the average precipitation across golf courses in 
different states, estimated from Panel A, to serve as an instrument for the close-to-golf 
weighted ownership   at the stock level.   
 Panel B reports the second-stage regressions results. In columns (1)-(3), we use the 
instrumented measure based on the weighted close-to-golf among all the investors. In 
columns (4)-(6), we use the instrumented measure based on the weighted close-to-golf 
among the non-local investors. In columns (3) and (6), we include firm fixed effects in the 
                                            
23 We control for investor and state fixed effects in all specifications. In columns (1)-(3), we use the full 
sample of investors to construct the weighted close-to-golf measure, while in columns (4)-(6) we only consider 
non-local investors. We identify an investor as non-local if it is located in a different state and the distance 
with the firm headquarter is more than 250 miles. In columns (3) and (6), we further include firm fixed 
effects in the regressions. 
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regressions. Across all specifications, the instrumented holdings weighted close-to-golf is 
positive and statistically significant. These results help to establish a causal link that 
ownership by close-to-golf investors do have significant impact on stock liquidity.   
7 Conclusion 
We hypothesize that a vibrant social environment potentially improves investor 
performance because these investors are more likely to have better information flow. We 
propose prestigious golf courses as social venues that may foster such social interaction 
and communication, particularly amongst business professionals and delegated asset 
managers.  
 Using the distance to prestigious golf courses to proxy for the intensity of sociability 
of institutional investors, we find evidence that institutional investors located close to 
prestigious golf courses (“close-to-golf” investors) exhibit better benchmark- and risk- 
adjusted performance. Analysis of the portfolio holdings of close-to-golf investors reveal 
that their portfolios are more concentrated, turnover more frequently, and exhibit more 
selectivity/activity – characteristic hallmarks of active trading with information 
advantages.   
 Since social interactions are difficult to observe, it may be easy to dismiss our findings 
as the result of data mining or spurious correlation. To provide plausible identification, 
we exploit potentially exogenous variation in social vibrancy around golf courses. We find 
that good performance occurs when 1.) golf courses have open/reciprocal guest policies 
2.) ‘Major’ championships rotate into the state 3.) low precipitation conditions allows for 
more social interactions. These tests help to rule out alternative explanations including 
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self-selection or local regional conditions (i.e. financial centers, local residential wealth). 
Our evidence supports the hypothesis that sociability affects investment outcomes and 
highlights the importance of social amenities in stimulating social interactions.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Investor Level Variables 
Close-to-golf:  First, we identify a set of prestigious golf courses. We obtain the data on the 
universe of U.S. golf courses from the golf course database provided by www.coursedatabase.com. 
The database covers 15479 U.S. golf courses (last updated on January 2013) with detailed 
information on the zip codes, guest policy, built year, and green fees. We focus on established golf 
courses that are built before 1991 which is the starting year of the sample period of institutional 
investors in this paper. We rank the universe of golf courses by their green fees and select the top 
decile courses as the set of prestigious golf courses. Second, for each institutional investor, we 
calculate a measure of distance-to-golf as the average geographical distance between the investor 
and the selected golf courses in the same state. As different states have different size and 
distribution of investors, we standardize the measure of distance-to-golf as divided by the value of 
state median distance-to-golf. Then, we define the measure of close-to-golf as: 
Close-to-golf=1-standardized distance-to-golf. 
Investor Size: the log value of the amount of investor portfolio holdings. 
Investor Age: the log value of the number of years since the investor first appears in the 
CDA/Spectrum 13F database. 
Portfolio Return (market adjusted, investor style adjusted, investor style & type adjusted): For 
each investor, we first calculate the holdings-based quarterly portfolio returns. We define the 
market adjusted portfolio as the difference between the raw portfolio return and the CRSP value-
weighted market return in the same quarter. Similarly, we calculate the style adjusted portfolio 
return as the raw return minus the median return among investors belonging to the same 
investment style. And we calculate the style & type adjusted portfolio return as the raw return 
minus the median portfolio return among investors having the same investor type and investment 
style. 
Portfolio Return (DGTW characteristics adjusted): We follow the methodology of Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) to calculate the DGTW adjusted portfolio returns. In 
every quarter t, and for each institutional investor j, we calculate the adjusted portfolio return as 
 Nj t i t 1 i t i ti 1, , , ,DGTW Ret Benchmarkω   , where ω୧,୲ିଵ is the portfolio weight on stock i at the 
end of quarter t-1, Reti,t is the quarter t return of stock i, and Benchmarki,t is the quarter t return 
of the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio that is matched to stock i along the dimensions of 
size (market value of equity), book-to-market ratio, and momentum.  
Portfolio Alpha (Carhart 4-factor, CAPM 1-factor, Fama-French 3-factor): We estimate the 
portfolio alphas from the Fama-French factor models. We first calculate the monthly holdings-
weighted investor returns using the previous quarter end holdings value as the weight. For each 
investor month, we use the previous 60 months of observations and regress the excess portfolio 
returns on the risk factors. We use the CAPM 1-factor model, the Fama-French 3-factor model 
and the Carhart 4-factor model and estimate the factor loadings accordingly. Then we calculate 
the portfolio alpha as the raw portfolio return in excess of the risk free rate minus the expected 
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returns equal to the factor returns in the contemporaneous month times the estimated factor 
loadings. 
Portfolio Churn Rate: The portfolio churn rate captures how frequently an investor rotates his 
positions on all the stocks of the portfolio. Investor-level portfolio information comes from 
CDA/Spectrum, a database of quarterly 13-F filings of asset managers to the SEC. If we denote 
the set of companies held by investor i by Q, the churn rate of investor i at quarter s is:   
1 1 1
1 1
2
, , , , , , , , ,
,
, , , , , ,
Δi j s j s i j s j s i j s j s
j Q
i s
i j s j s i j s j s
j Q
N P N P N P
ChurnRate N P N P
  

 

 
 

 , 
where Pj,s and Ni,j,s are the price and number of shares of stock j held by investor i. 
Portfolio Concentration: Portfolio concentration represents the investor’s concentration ratio 
(Herfindahl) of its portfolio. If we denote the set of stocks held by investor i by Q and tjiw ,,  the 
fraction invested in stock j, portfolio concentration is defined as: 2i,t i,j,t
j Q
Herfin w

  . 
Portfolio Selectivity (Carhart 4-factor model): In every quarter t, and for each institutional investor 
j, we calculate its daily buy-and-hold portfolio returns based on its previous quarter-end stock 
holdings. Then, for each investor-quarter (j, t), we compute the R2j,t from the following Carhart 
four-factor regression: 
 j,s s j j S s j s j s j s j,sr rf α β MKT -rf s SMB h HML u UMD ε s Quarter t,         
where rj,s is the daily portfolio return of investor j on date s, and the right-hand side variables 
include the excess market return over the risk-free rate (MKTs-rfs), the return difference between 
small and large capitalization stocks (SMBs), the return difference between high and low book-to-
market stocks (HMLs), and the return difference between stocks with high and low past returns 
(UMDs). The data of the risk-free rate, market return, SMB, HML and UMD are obtained from 
Kenneth French’s website. Then, for investor-quarter (j, t), we define the portfolio selectivity at 
the investor level as: 
1 2j,t j,tPortfolio Selectivity R   
Portfolio Distance: Portfolio distance measures the weighted average distance between the 
institutional investor and its portfolio holdings. If we denote the set of stocks held by investor i 
by Q and tjiw ,,  be the fraction of investor i invested in stock j, the portfolio distance is defined as: 
, , 3963 * arccos( sin( )sin( ) cos( )cos( )cos( ))i,t i j t i j i j i j
j Q
Portfolio Distance w lat lat lat lat lon lon

  
where ( ilat , ilon ), ( jlat , jlon ) are the (latitude, longitude) for investor i and stock j in radian 
degrees. 
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Firm Level Variables 
Close-to-golf weighted ownership: For each investor quarter, it is the close-to-golf weighted 
ownership  among all the institutional investors that hold the stock.  
Institutional ownership: For stock i at quarter t, it is the ratio of total institutional holdings 
divided by the number of shares outstanding.  
Stock return: the cumulative stock return in a year.  
Return volatility: the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year/quarter. To relate to the 
idiosyncratic volatility literature, we also compute the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks using the 
standard deviation of the regression residuals estimated from the Carhart 4-factor model. 
Amihud illiquidity: the Amihud (2000) illiquidity measure, at annual frequency. It averages the 
square root of the ratio of the absolute price change divided by daily dollar volume over each day 
in year t. It is calculated as: 
|daily return|
, |daily dollar volume|
1 (1000 * )i t
t Days t
Illiquidity
D 
   
where Dt is the number of days in year/quarter t.   
Firm size: the log value of book assets (Compustat Items, AT). 
Market-to-book: market value of assets/book assets, where the market value of assets is calculated 
as: stock price (PRCC_F) * shares outstanding (CSHO) + short term debt(DLC) + long term 
debt(DLTT) + preferred stock liquidation value (PSTKL) – deferred taxes and investment tax 
credits (TXDITC). 
Book leverage: total debt/book assets, where the total debt is long term debt (DLTT) + short 
term debt (DLC). 
Profitability: operating income before depreciation (OIBDP)/book assets (AT). 
Cash holding: cash and short-term investments (CHE)/book assets (AT). 
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Figure I 
Quarterly Portfolio Excess Returns of Institutional Investors Sorted on the 
Close-to-golf Measure 
 
This figure presents univariate sorts of institutional investors in our sample based on above and below 
median close-to-golf measure. Benchmark adjusted returns are in the upper portion and include market-, 
style-, and style & type- adjusted returns. Risk- and characteristics- adjusted returns are in the bottom 
portion and include CAPM 1-factor Alpha, Fama-French 3-factor Alpha, Carhart 4-factor Alpha, and 
DGTW-adjusted returns. The details of variable construction are available in the Appendix.  
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Figure II 
Portfolio Strategies of Institutional Investors Sorted on the Close-to-golf 
Measure 
 
This figure presents univariate sorts of institutional investors in our sample based on above and below 
median close-to-golf measure. Portfolio strategy measures including concentration, selectivity, and churn 
rate. The construction of these variables are available in the Appendix.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the study. Panel A reports the 
characteristics of the selected prestigious golf courses.  
 
Panel A: Prestigious Golf Courses by Top Decile Green Fees 
The complete universe of U.S. golf courses is from www.coursedatabase.com. The database covers 15,479 
US golf courses (last updated on January 2013) with detailed information on the zip code, guest policy, 
built year, and green fees. We only include established golf courses built before 1991 which is the starting 
year of the sample period of institutional investors in this study. We rank the full sample of golf courses by 
their green fees and select the top decile courses as the set of prestigious golf courses. For every state, we 
report the average minimum green fees, the average built year, and the number of the selected golf courses.  
 
State Name  State Code Average
Minimum Green Fee ($) 
Average
Built Year 
Number of Selected 
Golf Courses 
Alabama AL 93 1968 2 
Arizona AZ 94 1975 43 
Arkansas AR 82 1963 4 
California CA 96 1926 115 
Colorado CO 81 1970 18 
Connecticut CT 77 1936 13 
Delaware DE 67 1975 2 
Florida FL 84 1957 121 
Georgia GA 94 1960 18 
Idaho ID 84 1960 5 
Illinois IL 75 1869 64 
Indiana IN 99 1944 6 
Iowa IA 86 1937 3 
Kansas KS 102 1951 7 
Kentucky KY 75 1964 3 
Louisiana LA 78 1971 8 
Maine ME 65 1934 2 
Massachusetts MA 72 1938 34 
Michigan MI 71 1931 24 
Minnesota MN 79 1920 12 
Nevada NV 126 1975 16 
New Hampshire NH 75 1921 1 
New Jersey NJ 68 1940 28 
New Mexico NM 71 1961 3 
New York NY 75 1924 37 
North Carolina NC 81 1805 13 
Ohio OH 80 1934 28 
Oklahoma OK 81 1941 11 
Oregon OR 106 1931 8 
Pennsylvania PA 76 1895 51 
Rhode Island RI 100 1894 2 
South Carolina SC 112 1891 22 
Texas TX 73 1976 7 
Utah UT 85 1943 3 
Vermont VT 68 1610 6 
Virginia VA 80 1973 5 
Washington WA 89 1943 15 
West Virginia WV 55 1954 1 
Wisconsin WI 75 1944 16 
Wyoming WY 138 1970 3 
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Table I (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
The data on quarterly stock holdings of institutional investors are from Thomson CDA/Spectrum (13F) 
from 1990 to 2011. The data on daily and monthly stock returns, trading volumes and annual accounting 
information are from Compustat and CRSP. For each variable, we report the mean, the median and the 
standard deviation. The sample includes 90964 investor-quarter observations and 71051 firm-year 
observations.  
 
Variables Frequency Mean Median Std. Dev. N
  
Investor Level Variables  
  
Close-to-golf Quarter -0.092 0.000 0.444 90964
Investor Size ($millions) Quarter 4248.09 437.26 21107.82 90964
Investor Age Quarter 2.228 2.342 0.756 90964
Portfolio Return (Raw) Quarter 2.486 3.260 9.908 90964
Portfolio Return (Market-adjusted) Quarter 0.201 0.000 4.392 90964
Portfolio Return (Style-adjusted) Quarter 0.168 0.000 4.149 90964
Portfolio Return (Style & Type-adjusted) Quarter 0.148 0.000 4.054 90964
Portfolio Return (DGTW-adjusted) Quarter 0.183 0.006 3.715 90964
Portfolio Alpha (CAPM 1-factor) Quarter 0.420 0.204 4.233 84218
Portfolio Alpha (Fama-French 3-factor) Quarter 0.172 0.059 3.778 84218
Portfolio Alpha (Carhart 4-factor) Quarter 0.188 0.053 3.809 84218
Portfolio Churn Rate Quarter 0.550 0.368 0.437 90964
Portfolio Concentration Quarter 3.901 2.374 5.037 90964
Portfolio Selectivity Quarter 0.130 0.076 0.144 90964
Log (Portfolio Distance) Quarter 6.871 6.849 0.335 90964
  
Firm Level Variables  
  
Close-to-golf weighted ownership  Year -0.031 -0.013 0.118 71051
Firm Size Year 5.410 5.281 2.019 71051
Market-to-Book Year 1.920 1.184 2.996 71051
Book Leverage Year 0.215 0.174 0.207 71051
Profitability Year 0.061 0.107 0.332 71051
Cash Holding Year 0.187 0.089 0.226 71051
Institutional Ownership Year 0.410 0.374 0.290 71051
Investor Turnover Year 0.528 0.514 0.105 71051
Yearly Return Year 0.187 0.061 0.722 71051
Stock Return Volatility Year 0.038 0.033 0.024 71051
Illiquidity Year 0.447 0.187 0.581 71051
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Table I (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Univariate Sorts of Portfolio Strategy/Performance by Close-to-Golf 
This table presents univariate tests on the relation between the close-to-golf measure and investor 
performances and portfolio strategies. We split the sample by the median close-to-golf measure and we 
perform both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to compare the differences between the two subsamples.  ***, ** 
and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Main Dependent Variables Sample Split by Close-to-golf 
 Below median Above Median T-test Wilcoxon N
  
Portfolio Returns (Market-adjusted) 0.148 0.270 4.12*** 4.48*** 90964
Portfolio Returns (Style-adjusted) 0.128 0.220 3.31*** 3.83*** 90964
Portfolio Returns (Style & Type-adjusted) 0.112 0.196 3.05*** 3.53*** 90964
Portfolio Return (DGTW-adjusted) 0.150 0.226 3.06*** 2.71*** 90964
Portfolio Alpha (CAPM 1-factor) 0.380 0.473 3.14*** 3.75*** 84218
Portfolio Alpha (Fama-French 3-factor) 0.135 0.222 3.30*** 3.80*** 84218
Portfolio Alpha (Carhart 4-factor) 0.146 0.245 3.70*** 3.44*** 84218
  
Portfolio Churn Rate 0.534 0.571 12.73*** 13.41*** 90964
Portfolio Concentration 3.736 4.120 11.36*** 19.72*** 90964
Portfolio Selectivity 0.122 0.139 17.74*** 21.32*** 90964
Log (Portfolio Distance) 6.853 6.894 17.95*** 17.90*** 90964
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Table II 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Performance 
 
This table presents panel regression results of investment performance on the Close-to-golf measure. We 
estimate the following equation: 
 , , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tPortfolio Excess Returns α β Close - to -Golf δ X ε         
where portfolio excess returns are benchmark -adjusted (Panel A) and risk-adjusted (Panel B). Panel 
headers provide full details. We report regression specifications with and without state fixed effects. Investor 
style and investor type definitions are from Brain Bushee’s website. ***, ** and * represent significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors clustered by investor. T-statistics are 
given in parentheses. 
Panel A: Benchmark-adjusted Portfolio Returns 
This panel presents results using benchmark-adjusted returns including the market adjusted portfolio return, 
the investor style adjusted portfolio return and the investor type and style adjusted portfolio return. For 
each investor, we first calculate the holdings-based quarterly portfolio returns. We define the excess returns 
as the difference between the raw portfolio return and either the market portfolio, the median portfolio 
return among all investors in the same investor style, or the median return among investors belonging to 
the same investment type and style. 
Dependent variable:  Market Adjusted    Return 
Style Adjusted     
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted
Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Close-to-golf 0.125*** 0.136*** 0.123*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.135***
 (3.70) (3.84) (3.93) (4.03) (3.88) (4.03)
   
Log (Investor Size) -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.011 -0.017* -0.008 -0.014
 (-2.73) (-3.40) (-1.12) (-1.77) (-0.88) (-1.52)
Log (Investor Age) -0.071** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.085***
 (-2.56) (-2.67) (-2.83) (-3.00) (-3.21) (-3.39)
   
Investor Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Standard Error Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.009
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Table II (continued) 
Panel B: Risk- and Characteristic- Adjusted Portfolio Returns 
This panel presents results using risk- and characteristic-adjusted portfolio returns. We follow the methodology developed in Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (1997) to calculate the DGTW adjusted portfolio returns. Portfolio alphas are calculated based on Fama-French/Carhart 
factor models. We first calculate the monthly holdings-weighted investor returns using the previous quarter end holdings value as the weight. Then 
for each investor month, we use the previous 60 months of observations and regress the excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French risk factors to 
obtain factor loadings. We use the CAPM 1-factor model, the Fama-French 3-factor model and the Carhart 4-factor model and estimate the factor 
loadings accordingly. The portfolio alpha is the raw portfolio return in excess of the risk free rate minus the expected returns equal to the factor 
returns in the contemporaneous month times the estimated factor loadings. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, 
using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: DGTW Adjusted Return 
CAPM 1-factor
Alpha 
Fama-French 3-factor
Alpha 
Carhart 4-factor
Alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Close-to-golf 0.058** 0.067*** 0.107*** 0.123*** 0.090*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.126***
 (2.47) (2.79) (3.02) (3.31) (3.42) (3.63) (3.63) (4.20)
  
Log (Investor Size) -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.011 -0.020** -0.020** -0.024***
 (-2.60) (-2.91) (-2.98) (-3.57) (-1.27) (-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.74)
Log (Investor Age) -0.068*** -0.071*** 0.016 0.012 -0.048* -0.053* -0.053* -0.057**
 (-3.32) (-3.44) (0.48) (0.37) (-1.73) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.08)
  
Investor Type, Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - - - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,964 90,964 84,218 84,218 84,218 84,218 84,218 84,218
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Table III 
Social Interaction and Investment Performance: Guest Policy & Major Championships 
 
This table examines the relation between social interaction and investment performance using differences in guest policy and Major Championships 
across golf courses. Panel A presents analysis using differences in golf course guest policy. Panel B presents analysis using rotating locations of Major 
Championships.  
Panel A: Golf Course Guest Policy 
Golf courses with guest policies that are open/reciprocal are likely to be more socially vibrant than ones that are closed. We separately calculate two 
versions of the close-to-golf measure using only reciprocal guest policy golf courses (Close-to-golf Reciprocal) and closed guest policy golf courses 
(Close-to-golf Closed). The regression specifications include investor type fixed effects, investor style fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the investor level. We perform Chi-square tests to test the difference in coefficients. ***, ** and * 
represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable: Market Adjusted   Return 
Style Adjusted    
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted 
Return 
DGTW Adjusted       Return
 Reciprocal Closed Reciprocal Closed Reciprocal Closed Reciprocal Closed
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
Close-to-golf Reciprocal 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.158*** 0.077***
 (3.94) (4.00) (4.21) (3.11)
Close-to-golf Closed  0.063**  0.058**  0.070***  0.036* 
 (2.28) (2.31) (2.74) (1.93)
 
Log (Investor Size) -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.020** -0.020**
 (-2.81) (-2.78) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.38) (-1.36) (-2.44) (-2.42)
Log (Investor Age) -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.076*** -0.077***
 (-3.15) (-3.17) (-3.42) (-3.44) (-3.78) (-3.79) (-3.63) (-3.64)
 
Investor  Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE, State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 86,132 86,132 86,132 86,132 86,132 86,132 86,132 86,132
Chi-square Tests 5.17** 6.78*** 6.14** 2.77*
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Table III (Continued) 
Panel B: Major Golf Championships  
Two of the four most prestigious annual tournaments in professional golf (known as the Major 
Championships) change locations each year. The U.S. Open, hosted by the United States Golf Association, 
and the PGA Championship, hosted by the Professional Golfers' Association of America, are played at 
various locations in the United States. We define a dummy variable “Championship Dummy” equal to 1 if 
the state hosts a “U.S. Open” or “PGA Championship” in the year and 0 otherwise. Our variable of interest 
is the interaction between the close-to-golf and the championship dummy. All specifications include investor 
type and style fixed effects as well as state fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) present investor style adjusted 
portfolio return as the dependent variable, and columns (4)-(6) present DGTW adjusted portfolio return as 
the dependent variable. In both cases, we consider the close-to-golf measure using the full set of prestigious 
golf courses as well as separate measures by distinguishing the guest policies of these golf courses. We always 
cluster the errors at the investor level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Style Adjusted Return DGTW Adjusted Return 
 All Golf 
Courses 
Guest 
Policy: 
Reciprocal 
Guest 
Policy: 
Closed 
All Golf 
Courses 
Guest 
Policy: 
Reciprocal 
Guest 
Policy: 
Closed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Close-to-golf ×  
Championship Dummy 
0.256*** 
(3.11) 
0.267***
(3.34) 
0.143**
(2.25) 
0.183***
(3.06) 
0.200*** 
(3.38) 
0.052
(1.05) 
 
Close-to-golf 0.080** 0.091** 0.036 0.029 0.033 0.027
 (2.20) (2.34) (1.44) (1.04) (1.22) (1.41)
Championship Dummy 0.227*** 0.234*** 0.224*** 0.109** 0.113*** 0.100**
 (4.46) (4.56) (4.38) (2.54) (2.60) (2.32)
Log (Investor size) -0.017* -0.012 -0.012 -0.023*** -0.020** -0.020**
 (-1.81) (-1.29) (-1.23) (-2.91) (-2.48) (-2.44)
Log (Investor age) -0.076*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.077***
 (-2.96) (-3.39) (-3.43) (-3.41) (-3.61) (-3.64)
   
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,965 86,132 86,132 90,965 86,132 86,132
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Table IV  
Social Interaction and Investment Performance: Weather of Golf Courses  
 
We exploit the feature that golf is a particularly weather-dependent activity. We interact close-to-golf with the precipitation conditions around golf 
courses. Precipitation is measured using the standardized state precipitation index (SP01) from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). The 
standardized index allows for comparison between locations with markedly different climates because it adjusts for median weather conditions. We 
define “Good Weather Dummy I” if the standardized precipitation index is below the sample median. Alternatively, we define “Good Weather Dummy 
II” if the standardized precipitation index is below the state median. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we interact close-to-golf with the good weather 
dummy using the first definition, while in columns (2), (4), (6) we interact close-to-golf with the good weather dummy using the second definition. 
All specifications include investor type and style fixed effects as well as state fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Market Adjusted   Return 
Style Adjusted     
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted 
Return 
DGTW Adjusted 
Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
  
Close-to-golf ×  
Good Weather Dummy I 
0.237***
(4.85) 
0.205***
(4.27) 
0.184***
(4.14) 
0.144***
(2.88) 
  
Close-to-golf × 
Good Weather Dummy II 
0.243***
(4.95) 
0.206***
(4.09) 
 0.191***
(4.19) 
0.172***
(3.25) 
  
Close-to-golf 0.011 0.011 0.023 0.025 0.039 0.038 -0.009 -0.020
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.61) (0.65) (1.10) (1.08) (-0.25) (-0.53)
Good Weather Dummy I 0.002 0.010 0.006 -0.055**
 (0.05) (0.32) (0.19) (-2.04)
Good Weather Dummy II -0.013 -0.001  -0.005 -0.069**
 (-0.40) (-0.03)  (-0.17) (-2.58)
Log (Investor Size) -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.016* -0.016* -0.015 -0.015 -0.022*** -0.022***
 (-3.28) (-3.28) (-1.67) (-1.68) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-2.71) (-2.71)
Log (Investor Age) -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.073*** -0.073***
 (-2.74) (-2.74) (-3.00) (-2.99) (-3.46) (-3.46) (-3.53) (-3.53)
  
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969
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Table V 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Strategies 
 
This table presents panel regression results of various investment strategies on the close-to-golf measure. We 
estimate the following equation: 
 , , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tPortfolioStrategy α β Close - to -Golf δ X ε         
where for investment strategies, we consider investor portfolio churn rate, portfolio concentration and 
portfolio selectivity. Detailed variable definitions are described in the Appendix. We control for the 
institutional type of investors such as banks, insurance, investment advisors etc. We also control for the 
investment styles of institutional investors (growth/value/growth & income). Investor style and investor 
type definitions are from Brain Bushee’s website. Specifications (2), (4), (6) include state fixed effects. ***, 
** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with 
t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Investment Strategy 
Portfolio 
Churn Rate 
Portfolio 
Concentration 
Portfolio 
Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Close-to-golf 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.240* 0.323** 0.011*** 0.012***
 (3.66) (3.99) (1.72) (2.16) (2.72) (2.82)
   
Log (Investor Size) 0.002 -0.001 -0.711*** -0.730*** -0.022*** -0.023***
 (0.82) (-0.37) (-16.45) (-16.67) (-20.57) (-21.27)
Log (Investor Age) -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.307*** -0.328*** -0.010*** -0.010***
 (-9.51) (-9.88) (-2.94) (-3.21) (-3.72) (-4.05)
   
Investor Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
R-squared 0.509 0.531 0.199 0.221 0.287 0.315
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Table VI  
Excluding Local Stocks in Investors’ Portfolio 
 
This table presents our main tests while excluding local stocks in institutional investors’ portfolio. We 
identify an investor as non-local if it is located in a different state and the distance with the firm headquarter 
is more than 250 miles. Then, we exclude local stocks in investors’ portfolio, and calculate investor portfolio 
returns, portfolio churn rate, portfolio concentration, and portfolio selectivity in the same way as in the 
previous analyses. In Panel A, we link close-to-golf to investment performances, using the same specifications 
as in Table II. In Panel B, we relate the measure of close-to-golf to portfolio strategies. We always cluster 
the errors at the investor level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Investment Performance 
Dependent variable: 
Performance 
Market Adjusted   
Return 
Style Adjusted    
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted
Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.137*** 0.155*** 0.126*** 0.145*** 0.138*** 0.159***
 (4.00) (4.14) (3.92) (4.19) (4.25) (4.57)
   
Log (Investor Size) -0.025** -0.033*** -0.011 -0.018* -0.013 -0.020**
 (-2.28) (-3.08) (-1.14) (-1.93) (-1.39) (-2.17)
Log (Investor Age) -0.074** -0.079*** -0.067** -0.072*** -0.065** -0.070***
 (-2.50) (-2.73) (-2.40) (-2.64) (-2.40) (-2.64)
   
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560
 
Panel B: Portfolio Strategies 
Dependent variable: 
Investment Strategy 
Portfolio 
Churn Rate 
Portfolio 
Concentration 
Portfolio 
Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.574*** 0.627*** 0.016*** 0.017***
 (3.65) (3.99) (2.84) (2.83) (3.66) (3.50)
   
Log (Investor Size) 0.003 0.000 -1.105*** -1.161*** -0.025*** -0.026***
 (1.21) (0.05) (-16.99) (-17.90) (-20.38) (-22.56)
Log (Investor Age) -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.369** -0.430*** -0.010*** -0.011***
 (-9.51) (-9.91) (-2.53) (-3.08) (-3.46) (-4.23)
   
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560 90,560
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Table VII 
Closeness to Golf and Portfolio Distance 
 
This table presents panel regression results of investor portfolio distance on the close-to-golf measure. We estimate the following equation: 
, , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tPortfolioDistance α β Close - to -Golf δ X ε       . 
Detailed definitions are described in the Appendix. In columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is the logrithm of portfolio distances calculated based 
on investors’ entire portfolio holdings. In columns (6)-(10), we calculate the portfolio distance in the same way but excluding local stocks from 
investors’ portfolios. We identify an investor as non-local if it is located in a different state and the distance with the firm headquarter is more than 
250 miles. In columns (3) and (8), we interact the close-to-golf measure with the championship dummy as previously defined.  In columns (4)-(5) 
and columns (9)-(10), we separately calculate two alternative versions of the close-to-golf measure using only reciprocal golf courses and closed golf 
courses in terms of guest policy. We perform Chi-square tests to test the difference in coefficients. We always include investor type fixed effects, 
investor style fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. Specifications (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the investor level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Log (Portfolio Distance): All Stocks Log (Portfolio Distance): Non-Local Stocks
 All Courses Reciprocal Closed All Courses Reciprocal Closed
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
   
Close-to-golf 0.056*** 0.025*** 0.019** 0.038*** 0.004 0.097*** 0.058*** 0.050*** 0.076*** 0.021***
 (3.74) (3.20) (2.45) (4.24) (0.79) (7.26) (6.32) (5.87) (7.82) (2.91)
Close-to-golf ×  
Championship Dummy 
 0.031***
(3.34) 
 0.040***
(5.31) 
   
Championship Dummy  0.008**  0.002
  (2.38)  (0.97)
Log (Investor Size) 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
 (3.43) (4.40) (4.39) (4.39) (4.51) (2.09) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.71)
Log (Investor Age) -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
 (-0.39) (0.08) (0.09) (-0.30) (-0.37) (-0.39) (-1.02) (-1.01) (-1.19) (-1.29)
   
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor  Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,906 90,906 90,906 86,132 86,132 90,831 90,831 90,831 85,962 85,962
R-square 0.075 0.523 0.523 0.499 0.497 0.088 0.710 0.711 0.709 0.700
Chi-square Tests - - - 13.07*** - - - 18.73***
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Table VIII 
Return Co-movement and Strategy Co-movement  
with Nearby Close-to-Golf Investors 
This table examines how the co-movement of investor portfolio performance and strategies with their 
geographically proximate neighbors varies dependent on their close-to-golf measure. For each institutional 
investor, we identify nearby investors as all the other investors that are located within 50 miles from the 
investor. Then, we calculate the average performance measures and average portfolio strategies of all nearby 
investors. The key variable of interest is the interaction term between the nearby return (nearby strategy) 
with close-to-golf. Panel A reports the results of the co-movement in portfolio performance with nearby 
investors. Panel B presents the results of the co-movement in portfolio strategies with nearby investors. We 
include year-quarter fixed effects in all specifications and we always cluster the errors at the investor level. 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with 
t-statistics given in parentheses.  
Panel A: Return Co-movement with Nearby Investors 
Dependent Variable: Style AdjustedReturn 
Style & Type
Adjusted Return 
DGTW
Adjusted Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Nearby Return 0.308*** 0.350*** 0.274*** 0.313*** 0.267*** 0.290***
 (8.91) (9.42) (7.87) (8.33) (11.18) (11.23)
   
Nearby Return × 
Close-to-Golf 
 0.157***
(4.09) 
0.143***
(3.80) 
 0.065***
(2.82) 
   
Close-to-Golf  0.074* 0.075**  0.064**
  (1.86) (2.01)  (2.30)
   
Year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705
 
Panel B: Portfolio Strategy Co-movement with Nearby Investors 
Dependent Variable: Portfolio Churn Rate Portfolio Concentration Portfolio Selectivity
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Nearby Strategy 0.598*** 0.593*** 0.163*** 0.183*** 0.371*** 0.400***
 (15.56) (14.84) (4.25) (4.37) (8.66) (9.07)
   
Nearby Strategy × 
Close-to-Golf 
 0.033***
(2.66) 
0.162***
(3.64) 
 0.191***
(3.90) 
   
Close-to-Golf  0.004 -0.208  -0.013
  (0.37) (-0.86)  (-1.51)
   
Year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705 89,705
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Table IX 
Holdings Weighted Close-to-golf Measure and Stock Return Predictability 
 
This table reports the returns of stock portfolios sorted by the close-to-golf holdings-weighted measure. The 
close-to-golf weighted ownership measure is calculated each stock-quarter as the average close-to-golf 
measure of all institutional investors that hold the stock weighted by the amount of ownership each investors 
holds. Then, at each month-beginning from January 1991 to December 2011, stocks are sorted into quintiles 
based on the previous quarter-end holdings weighted close-to-golf measure. Portfolio 1 has the lowest close-
to-golf ownership. Portfolio 5 has the highest close-to-golf weighted ownership measure. “Long Portfolio 5 
& Short Portfolio 1” is the difference in the returns between the highest and lowest close-to-golf portfolios. 
Equally-weighted returns for the five portfolios are calculated over the month. For each portfolio, we report 
the raw average portfolio return, the excess return (i.e., alpha) from the CAPM 1-factor (market factor) 
model, the alpha from the Fama-French 3-factor (market factor, SMB, HML) model, and the alpha from 
the Carhart 4-factor (market factor, SMB, HML, and momentum factor) model. Panel A presents results 
based on the weighted close-to-golf among all the investors. Panel B presents results based on weighted 
close-to-golf among all of the non-local investors. An investor is non-local if it is located in a different state 
and the distance with the firm headquarter is more than 250 miles. ***, ** and * represent significance 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. N 
denotes the number of total months. 
Panel A: Close-to-golf Weighted Ownership 
 
Panel B: Close-to-golf Weighted Ownership excluding Local Ownership 
  
Portfolio Sorting by Close-to-golf 
weighted ownership   
Raw Excess 
Return 
CAPM 1-factor
Alpha 
FF 3-factor
Alpha 
Carhart 4-
factor Alpha 
N
Portfolio 1 0.0084 0.0025 0.0005 0.0025** 252
 (1.53) (0.43) (2.44) 
Portfolio 2 0.0094 0.0032** 0.0014 0.0031*** 252
 (2.05) (1.27) (2.95) 
Portfolio 3 0.0097 0.0036** 0.0017 0.0033*** 252
 (2.04) (1.47) (3.00) 
Portfolio 4 0.0102 0.0040* 0.0016 0.0035** 252
 (1.88) (1.12) (2.37) 
Portfolio 5 0.0128 0.0072*** 0.0047** 0.0070*** 252
 (2.71) (2.43) (3.46) 
  
Long Portfolio5 & Short Portfolio 1 0.0044*** 0.0046*** 0.0043*** 0.0045*** 252
 (2.93) (3.09) (3.35) (3.16) 
Portfolio Sorting by Close-to-golf 
weighted ownership   
Raw Excess 
Return 
CAPM 1-factor
Alpha 
FF 3-factor
Alpha 
Carhart 4-
factor Alpha 
N
Portfolio 1 0.0086 0.0025 0.0008 0.0028*** 252
 (1.54) (0.72) (2.74) 
Portfolio 2 0.0095 0.0033* 0.0015 0.0033*** 252
 (1.95) (1.33) (3.20) 
Portfolio 3 0.0095 0.0035* 0.0016 0.0032*** 252
 (1.92) (1.28) (2.67) 
Portfolio 4 0.0098 0.0038* 0.0011 0.0030** 252
 (1.86) (0.86) (2.37) 
Portfolio 5 0.0124 0.0068*** 0.0043** 0.0065*** 252
 (2.71) (2.28) (3.32) 
  
Long Portfolio5 & Short Portfolio 1 0.0037*** 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0037*** 252
 (2.67) (3.08) (2.85) (2.74) 
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Table X 
Close-to-Golf Weighted Ownership Measure and Informed Trading (PIN) 
 
This table presents stock-level analysis on the relation between close-to-golf weighted ownership and the 
probability of informed trades (PIN). The close-to-golf weighted ownership measure is calculated each stock-
quarter as the average close-to-golf measure of all institutional investors that hold the stock weighted by 
the amount of ownership each investors holds. The quarterly data on the PIN measure from 1993 to 2010 
are obtained from Stephen Brown’s website at http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-
data?destination=node/998. The procedures to construct PIN are detailed in Brown and Hillegeist (2007). 
We estimate the following equation: 
1 1, , - , - ,PINi t i t i t i tα β Close - to -Golf  weighted Ownership δ X ε      , 
 where Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm characteristics including firm size, market-to-book, book leverage, 
profitability, cash holding, institutional ownership, institutional turnover, yearly return and stock return 
volatility.  Columns (1)-(3) use close-to-golf weighted ownership measure among all the investors. Columns 
(4)-(6) use the close-to-golf weighted ownership measure among all the non-local investors. An investor is 
non-local if it is located in a different state and the distance with the firm headquarter is more than 250 
miles. Columns (3) and (6) include firm fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: PIN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  
Close-to-golf weighted ownership  
(all investors) 
0.034*** 0.033*** 0.025***  
(6.94) (6.75) (6.14)  
  
Close-to-golf weighted ownership  
(non-local investors) 
0.028*** 0.025*** 0.015***
(7.16) (6.55) (4.80)
  
Controls  
Firm Size -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.026***
 (-62.30) (-62.31) (-28.84) (-62.10) (-62.25) (-28.82)
Market-to-Book -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004***
 (-13.27) (-13.35) (-11.65) (-12.99) (-13.11) (-11.56)
Book Leverage 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.035***
 (11.96) (11.93) (9.64) (12.03) (12.03) (9.86)
Profitability 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.002 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.001
 (3.17) (3.09) (-0.48) (3.14) (3.06) (-0.44)
Cash Holding -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.005 -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.004
 (-8.91) (-8.31) (-1.44) (-8.74) (-8.32) (-1.20)
Institutional Ownership -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.074***
 (-32.40) (-32.03) (-23.25) (-32.35) (-32.03) (-23.19)
Investor Turnover -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.022***
 (-7.07) (-6.71) (-4.45) (-7.11) (-6.84) (-4.42)
Yearly Return -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
 (-19.98) (-19.98) (-24.59) (-20.15) (-20.20) (-24.65)
Stock Return Volatility -0.683*** -0.672*** -0.485*** -0.679*** -0.669*** -0.492***
 (-14.97) (-14.80) (-11.67) (-14.65) (-14.48) (-11.57)
  
Year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) Y Y - Y Y -
State FE - Y - - Y -
Firm FE - - Y - - Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 184,596 184,596 184,596 183,117 183,117 183,117
R-squared 0.412 0.413 0.545 0.412 0.414 0.545
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Table XI 
Close-to-Golf Weighted Ownership Measure and Stock Liquidity 
 
This table presents stock-level analysis on the relation between close-to-golf weighted ownership and stock 
liquidity. The close-to-golf weighted ownership measure is calculated each stock-quarter as the average close-
to-golf measure of all institutional investors that hold the stock weighted by the amount of ownership each 
investors holds. Liquidity is measured using the ILLIQ measure (Amihud, 2002) defined as the average of 
the square root of the ratio of the absolute price change divided by daily dollar volume over each day in a 
year. We estimate the following equation: 
1 1, , - , - ,ILLIQi t i t i t i tα β Close - to -Golf  weighted Ownership δ X ε      , 
 where Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm characteristics including firm size, market-to-book, book leverage, 
profitability, cash holding, institutional ownership, institutional turnover, yearly return and stock return 
volatility. Close-to-golf ownership is calculated as An investor is non-local if it is located in a different state 
and the distance with the firm headquarter is more than 250 miles.  Columns (1)-(3) use close-to-golf 
weighted ownership measure among all the investors. Columns (4)-(6) use the close-to-golf weighted 
ownership measure among all the non-local investors. Columns (3) and (6) include firm fixed effects. ***, 
** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with t-
statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Illiquidity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  
Close-to-golf weighted ownership  
(all investors) 
0.210*** 0.203*** 0.110***  
(10.29) (9.96) (6.09)  
  
Close-to-golf weighted ownership  
(non-local investors) 
0.172*** 0.157*** 0.089***
(10.11) (9.30) (6.17)
  
Controls  
Firm Size -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.144***
 (-48.53) (-48.43) (-30.65) (-47.63) (-47.63) (-30.15)
Market-to-Book -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.019***
 (-14.75) (-14.90) (-11.07) (-14.26) (-14.39) (-10.98)
Book Leverage 0.273*** 0.270*** 0.277*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.268***
 (15.86) (15.70) (15.44) (15.55) (15.41) (14.83)
Profitability 0.054*** 0.052*** -0.065*** 0.053*** 0.051*** -0.064***
 (3.12) (3.02) (-3.92) (3.05) (2.98) (-3.86)
Cash Holding -0.249*** -0.237*** -0.080*** -0.246*** -0.237*** -0.080***
 (-15.93) (-14.83) (-4.56) (-15.83) (-14.92) (-4.56)
Institutional Ownership -0.355*** -0.349*** -0.090*** -0.353*** -0.348*** -0.091***
 (-27.84) (-27.03) (-5.90) (-27.63) (-26.94) (-5.95)
Investor Turnover -0.551*** -0.539*** -0.303*** -0.576*** -0.567*** -0.321***
 (-19.30) (-19.05) (-12.73) (-20.10) (-19.94) (-13.45)
Yearly Return -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100***
 (-30.39) (-30.70) (-36.43) (-30.05) (-30.30) (-36.22)
Stock Return Volatility 5.072*** 5.115*** 3.684*** 5.207*** 5.251*** 3.815***
 (12.43) (12.25) (9.74) (12.35) (12.19) (9.26)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) Y Y - Y Y -
State FE - Y - - Y -
Firm FE - - Y - - Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 71,051 71,051 71,051 70,446 70,446 70,446
R-squared 0.569 0.572 0.769 0.563 0.565 0.767
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Table XII 
Close-to-Golf Weighted Ownership Measure and Stock Liquidity:  
Instrumental Variables Regression 
 
In this table, we use the precipitation levels around golf courses to instrument for the close-to-golf weighted 
ownership measure and then link it to stock liquidity in an instrumental variables regression. 
 
  
Panel A: Close-to-Golf Weighted Ownership and Weather of Golf Courses  
(Firm-Investor State Analysis) 
 
In Panel A, we verify the relevance of the instrument. The close-to-golf weighted ownership measure is 
calculated each stock-quarter as the average close-to-golf measure of all institutional investors that hold the 
stock weighted by the amount of ownership each investors holds. In particular, we perform an analysis at 
the firm-investor state level. In each quarter, for every stock i and State J pair, we calculate the close-to-
golf weighted ownership among all investors that are located in State J.  Then, we regress the weighted 
close-to-golf on the average precipitation among all the selected golf courses in State J. We control for 
investor state fixed effects in all specifications. In columns (1)-(3), we use the full sample of investors to 
construct the weighted close-to-golf measure, while in columns (4)-(6) we only consider non-local investors. 
We identify an investor as non-local if it is located in a different state and the distance with the firm 
headquarter is more than 250 miles. In columns (3) and (6), we further include firm fixed effects in the 
regressions.  
 
 
Dep. Var.: Close-to-golf weighted 
ownership  
All Investor States Non-Local Investor States
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  
Golf Course Precipitation -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
 (-17.60) (-17.64) (-17.86) (-17.94) (-17.90) (-18.03)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm State FE - Y - - Y -
Firm FE - - Y - - Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 1,265,337 1,265,337 1,265,337 1,108,244 1,108,244 1,108,244
R-squared 0.309 0.310 0.321 0.297 0.298 0.312
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Table XII (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Regression 
 
In Panel B, for each firm, we use the average precipitation across golf courses in different states, estimated 
from Panel A, to serve as an instrument for the close-to-golf weighted ownership at the stock level.  We 
report the second-stage regressions results. In columns (1)-(3), we use the measure based on the weighted 
close-to-golf among all the investors. In columns (4)-(6), we use the measure based on the weighted close-
to-golf among all the non-local investors. In columns (3) and (6), we include firm fixed effects in the 
regressions. We always cluster the errors at the firm level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Illiquidity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Instrumented Close-to-golf weighted 
ownership (all investors) 
2.236*** 2.212*** 1.769***  
(8.54) (8.72) (5.94)  
Instrumented Close-to-golf weighted 
ownership (non-local investors) 
1.333*** 1.351*** 0.913***
(9.22) (8.46) (5.34)
  
Controls  
Firm Size -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.140***
 (-41.56) (-41.63) (-35.83) (-42.61) (-43.25) (-38.34)
Market-to-Book -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.019***
 (-13.03) (-13.06) (-15.43) (-12.41) (-12.41) (-15.51)
Book Leverage 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.246*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.253***
 (10.98) (11.14) (15.72) (13.16) (13.29) (17.51)
Profitability 0.054*** 0.052*** -0.072*** 0.052*** 0.053*** -0.071***
 (2.87) (2.79) (-5.96) (2.81) (2.85) (-5.87)
Cash Holding -0.232*** -0.218*** -0.063*** -0.212*** -0.221*** -0.068***
 (-13.26) (-12.24) (-4.30) (-12.48) (-13.03) (-4.91)
Institutional Ownership -0.213*** -0.209*** -0.013 -0.264*** -0.260*** -0.050***
 (-8.98) (-8.98) (-0.72) (-14.83) (-14.25) (-3.73)
Investor Turnover -0.456*** -0.441*** -0.241*** -0.496*** -0.495*** -0.287***
 (-13.85) (-13.56) (-10.13) (-15.77) (-15.91) (-13.10)
Yearly Return -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.103***
 (-28.63) (-28.88) (-40.71) (-29.25) (-29.24) (-43.21)
Stock Return Volatility 4.731*** 4.819*** 3.452*** 5.096*** 5.074*** 3.646***
 (11.83) (11.76) (9.60) (12.17) (12.00) (9.22)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) Y Y - Y Y -
State FE - Y - - Y -
Firm FE - - Y - - Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
F-statistic of weak instruments   322.43 335.80 197.11 644.03 551.90 371.21
Number of Observations 71,034 71,034 71,034 70,429 70,429 70,429
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Internet Appendix 
 
This is the Internet appendix for “Sociability, Golf Courses, and the Performance of 
Institutional Investors.” This supplementary appendix is not meant for publication in 
print. It can be made available on a Journal website and the authors' websites upon 
publication. It reports the complete results of additional tests described in the main text, 
but not included in the main table for brevity.  
 Section I reports alternative econometric specifications for our main tests. Section II 
reports results using three alternative close–to–golf measures constructed using alternative 
measures of distance, locality, and course prestige. We also present the results of a placebo 
test constructed using golf courses with the lowest green fees. Section III presents risk-
adjusted return results for the weather analysis which include DGTW-adjusted returns 
and portfolio alphas.  
I. Alternative Econometric Specifications 
This sections presents alternative econometric specifications including double-clustered 
standard error specifications for the main investment performance and portfolio strategy 
results and investor-level fixed effects in the causality tests 
A. Robustness: Standard Error Specification 
 We present an alternative method for clustering the standard error in our main 
investment performance tests (Table II) and portfolio strategy tests (Table V). Since there 
is a potential concern of cross-sectional correlation in returns, we additionally cluster our 
panel regression by investor and quarter.  
 Table A1 shows that our inferences are unchanged with the inclusion of time clusters. 
Panel A shows that the coefficient estimate on the close-to-golf measure remains 
statistically significant across market-, style-, and style-type adjusted returns. However, 
the coefficient estimates on the control variables, Log (Investor Size) and Log (Investor 
Age), are no longer significant in most of the specifications. Panel B shows that the 
relation between the close-to-golf measure and portfolio strategies is nearly identical with 
the inclusion of the additional time cluster. Compared to Table V, the standard errors on 
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the coefficient estimates for the close-to-golf measure are nearly unchanged. 
B. Robustness: Investor Fixed Effects 
 We present an additional econometric specification that includes investor fixed effects 
for our causality tests presented in Table III and Table IV in the main text. Since 
institutional investor locations are generally static, there remains concerns that regional 
effects may be behind our results. The inclusion of investor fixed effects should alleviate 
some of these concerns since it removes unobserved investor heterogeneity. 
 Table A2 shows that the inclusion of investor fixed effects does not significantly 
change our main inferences from our causality tests. Panel A shows that the Championship 
Dummy interaction remains positive and statistically significant for courses with 
reciprocal policies and remains insignificant for closed policy courses. Panel B shows that 
results from the Weather shock remains unchanged. 
 In sum, our main results are robust to alternative econometric specifications which 
addresses concerns relating to standard error estimates and unobserved investor 
heterogeneity. 
II. Alternative Measurement: Close to Golf Measure 
In this section, we address concerns relating to our close-to-golf measure. In the main text, 
the close-to-golf measure is constructed as a relative within state measure because we are 
primarily concerned with state-level differences driving our results. However, this choice 
represents a trade-off. While it is able to address our main concern, it may not reflect 
actual distance to golf courses experienced by investors. Also, while green fees may be 
reasonable proxy for prestige of golf courses, there may be dimensions of quality not 
captured by fees. 
A. Alternative Measure 1:  Non-standardized Distance 
 To address concerns with measuring actual distance, we create an unstandardized 
value of the close-to-golf measure by using the negative value of the logarithm of the 
average distance to prestigious golf courses in each state.  
 Table A3 Panel A presents the results. We find that the investment performance and 
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portfolio strategy results are unchanged using this alternative measure. The coefficient 
estimate on the non-standardized close-golf measure is positive and statistically significant 
across all specifications. 
B. Alternative Measure 2: Number of Nearby Prestigious Golf Courses 
 Another potential concern with our measure of distance is that certain investor may 
be close to state borders and may have access to nearby golf courses in other states. This 
makes our within state assumption potentially restrictive and noisy. To address this, we 
create a measure based on the number of prestigious golf course within a 100 mile radius 
of the investors. 
 Table A3 Panel B shows our main inferences are unchanged using this measure. 
Columns (1)-(3) show that the investment performance results are unchanged using this 
alternative measure, while columns (4)-(6) show that the portfolio strategy results are 
similar. The coefficient estimate on the non-standardized close-golf measure is positive 
and statistically significant across all specifications. 
C. Alternative Measure 3: Golflink.com Prestigious Golf Courses 
 Using golf course rankings for the top 20 golf courses in each state from Golflink.com, 
we re-estimate our baseline regression models. Golflink.com rankings are perhaps 
subjective in nature, but may also capture aspects of golf club quality that are missed by 
simply assessing course fees. Golflink.com provides ranking for all 50 states, allowing us 
to perform analysis for all states and the full set of institutional investors.The data are 
available at http://www.golflink.com/top-golf-courses/.  
 The results presented in Table A4 are similar to our main findings. It provides an 
additional robustness check to our definition of ‘prestigious’ golf course which we define 
as having course fees in the top decile.  
D.  Placebo Test: Bottom 10% Green Fees 
We perform a “placebo” analysis to test the validity of our definition of ‘prestigious’ golf 
courses. If our story is correct, we expect that proximity to non-prestigious golf courses is 
unlikely to affect institutional investors’ portfolio strategies and performance. To define 
non-prestigious, we use golf courses in the bottom decile of green fees, which tend be 
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public courses, and re-estimate our main analysis.  
 Table A5 shows that both investment performance and portfolio strategies are 
unrelated to the distance to non-prestigious golf courses. 
III. Precipitation Tests:  Risk-adjusted Performance 
 The main text employs an identification strategy which exploits the precipitation at 
the golf course to derive exogenous variation in social participation and vibrancy. For 
brevity in the main text, we omit factor model returns and conditional tests based on 
reciprocal policies. We present those results here.  
Table A6 presents the results of identical regression tests using the complete set of 
risk-adjusted returns. Panel A presents the results using DGTW-adjustment while Panel 
B presents risk-adjusted returns for the CAPM 1-factor, Fama-French 3-factor, and 
Carhart 4-factor risk models. The results are robust to the usage of these return 
adjustments across regression specification.  
 
  
5 
 
Table A1 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Performance/Portfolio Strategy: 
Double Clustering Standard Errors by Investor and Time 
 
This table presents our main investment performance and portfolio strategy tests double clustering standard 
errors by both investor and time (Petersen, 2009). Panel A presents results on the relation between the 
close-to-golf measure and investment performance using the same regression equation as in Table II. Panel 
B presents results on the relation between the close-to-golf measure and portfolio strategies using the same 
regression equation as in Table V. ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Investment Performance 
Dependent variable: 
Performance 
Market Adjusted   
Return 
Style Adjusted    
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted 
Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.125*** 0.136*** 0.123*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.135***
 (2.73) (2.80) (2.85) (2.87) (2.88) (2.93)
   
Log (Investor Size) -0.028 -0.035 -0.011 -0.017 -0.008 -0.014
 (-0.86) (-1.12) (-0.35) (-0.59) (-0.29) (-0.53)
Log (Investor Age) -0.071 -0.073 -0.074 -0.077 -0.082* -0.085*
 (-1.29) (-1.31) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-1.65) (-1.68)
   
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time 
Investor & 
Time
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Strategies 
Dependent variable: 
Investment Strategy 
Portfolio 
Churn Rate 
Portfolio 
Concentration 
Portfolio 
Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.240* 0.323** 0.011*** 0.012***
 (3.62) (3.96) (1.73) (2.17) (2.71) (2.81)
   
Log (Investor Size) 0.002 -0.001 -0.711*** -0.730*** -0.022*** -0.023***
 (0.72) (-0.32) (-16.05) (-16.29) (-14.45) (-15.06)
Log (Investor Age) -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.307*** -0.328*** -0.010*** -0.010***
 (-8.39) (-8.82) (-2.80) (-3.04) (-3.37) (-3.64)
   
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor & 
Time 
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time
Investor & 
Time 
Investor & 
Time
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
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Table A2  
Social Interaction and Investment Performance:  
Including Investor Fixed Effects 
This table presents the results of our social interaction and investment performance tests including investor 
fixed effects. Panel A presents results using Major Championship rotations. Panel B presents results using 
precipitation around the golf course. 
Panel A: Major Championships with Investor Fixed Effects 
Two of the four most prestigious annual tournaments in professional golf (known as the Major 
Championships) change locations each year. The U.S. Open, hosted by the United States Golf Association, 
and the PGA Championship, hosted by the Professional Golfers' Association of America, are played at 
various locations in the United States. We define a dummy variable “Championship Dummy” equal to 1 if 
the state hosts a “U.S. Open” or “PGA Championship” in the year and 0 otherwise. Our variable of interest 
is the interaction between the close-to-golf and the championship dummy. All specifications include investor 
fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) present investor style adjusted portfolio return as the dependent variable, and 
columns (4)-(6) present DGTW adjusted portfolio return as the dependent variable. In both cases, we 
consider the close-to-golf measure using the full set of prestigious golf courses as well as separate measures 
by distinguishing the guest policies of these golf courses. We always cluster the errors at the investor level. 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with 
t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Style Adjusted Return DGTW Adjusted Return
 All Golf 
Courses 
Guest 
Policy: 
Reciprocal 
Guest 
Policy: 
Closed 
All Golf 
Courses 
Guest 
Policy: 
Reciprocal 
Guest 
Policy: 
Closed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Close-to-golf ×  
Championship Dummy 
0.206** 
(2.39) 
0.223***
(2.77) 
0.096
(1.43) 
0.174***
(2.80) 
0.199*** 
(3.18) 
0.029
(0.54) 
 
Close-to-golf 0.074 0.055 -0.070 0.041 0.023 -0.042
 (1.05) (0.76) (-1.39) (0.73) (0.40) (-1.04)
Championship Dummy 0.214*** 0.219*** 0.207*** 0.096** 0.097** 0.081*
 (4.17) (4.22) (4.01) (2.21) (2.19) (1.84)
Log (Investor size) -0.255*** -0.228*** -0.229*** -0.204*** -0.188*** -0.188***
 (-9.90) (-8.66) (-8.67) (-8.85) (-8.24) (-8.25)
Log (Investor age) -0.044 -0.077 -0.077 -0.049 -0.048 -0.049
 (-0.75) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.96)
   
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 90,965 86,132 86,132 90,965 86,132 86,132
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Table A2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Weather of Golf Courses with Investor Fixed Effects 
 
In Panel B, we exploit the feature that golf is a particularly weather-dependent activity. We interact close-to-golf with the precipitation conditions 
around golf courses. Precipitation is measured using the standardized state precipitation index (SP01) from the National Climatic Data Center 
(NCDC). The standardized index allows for comparison between locations with markedly different climates because it adjusts for median weather 
conditions. We define “Good Weather Dummy I” if the standardized precipitation index is below the sample median. Alternatively, we define “Good 
Weather Dummy II” if the standardized precipitation index is below the state median. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we interact close-to-golf with the 
good weather dummy using the first definition, while in columns (2), (4), (6) we interact close-to-golf with the good weather dummy using the second 
definition. To establish causality, we control for investor fixed effects in all specifications. To avoid the econometric issue of short panels with fixed 
effects, we require that each investor should have more than 20 quarterly observations. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Market Adjusted   Return 
Style Adjusted     
Return 
Style & Type Adjusted
Return 
DGTW Adjusted 
Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Close-to-golf ×  
Good Weather Dummy I 
0.266***
(5.36) 
0.228***
(4.62) 
0.209***
(4.56) 
0.158***
(3.06) 
  
Close-to-golf × 
Good Weather Dummy II 
0.261***
(5.20) 
0.218***
(4.27) 
 0.203***
(4.41) 
0.178***
(3.34) 
  
Close-to-golf -0.048 -0.046 -0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.011 -0.018 -0.027
 (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.08) (-0.02) (0.11) (0.15) (-0.27) (-0.42)
Good Weather Dummy I -0.001 0.008 0.003 -0.052*
 (-0.04) (0.25) (0.11) (-1.89)
Good Weather Dummy II -0.015 -0.001  -0.006 -0.066**
 (-0.46) (-0.04)  (-0.18) (-2.42)
Log (Investor Size) -0.309*** -0.309*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.198*** -0.198***
 (-11.20) (-11.20) (-9.76) (-9.76) (-9.03) (-9.04) (-8.58) (-8.58)
Log (Investor Age) -0.042 -0.042 -0.056 -0.056 -0.080 -0.080 -0.055 -0.055
 (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.38) (-1.38) (-1.11) (-1.11)
  
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969 89,969
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Table A3 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Performance/Portfolio Strategy: 
Alternative Close-to-Golf Measures 
 
This table presents our main performance and portfolio strategy tests using two alternative close-to-golf measures. Panel A presents results using the 
negative value of the logarithm of the average distance to prestigious golf courses in each state. Panel B presents results using the logarithm of the 
number of prestigious golf courses within 100 miles from the location of the investor. All specifications include year-quarter fixed effects, investor 
type and style fixed effects as well as state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the investor level. 
 Panel A: Non-standardized Close-to-Golf 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Market Adjusted   
Return 
Style Adjusted    
Return 
Style & Type 
Adjusted Return
Portfolio 
Churn Rate 
Portfolio 
Concentration 
Portfolio 
Selectivity 
 
Close-to-golf 0.176*** 0.169*** 0.172*** 0.048*** 0.495** 0.018***
 (3.06) (3.15) (3.22) (3.21) (2.09) (2.70)
Log (Investor Size) -0.034*** -0.016* -0.013 -0.001 -0.729*** -0.023***
 (-3.33) (-1.69) (-1.44) (-0.28) (-16.64) (-21.25)
Log (Investor Age) -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.086*** -0.063*** -0.330*** -0.010***
 (-2.71) (-3.03) (-3.42) (-9.92) (-3.23) (-4.08)
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE, State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
 
Panel B: Number of Nearby Prestigious Golf Courses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Market Adjusted   
Return 
Style Adjusted    
Return 
Style & Type 
Adjusted Return
Portfolio 
Churn Rate 
Portfolio 
Concentration 
Portfolio 
Selectivity 
 
Close-to-golf 0.129*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.035*** 0.289** 0.012***
 (3.89) (3.74) (3.93) (4.14) (2.34) (3.24)
Log (Investor Size) -0.035*** -0.017* -0.014 -0.001 -0.730*** -0.023***
 (-3.41) (-1.76) (-1.51) (-0.37) (-16.59) (-21.29)
Log (Investor Age) -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.084*** -0.062*** -0.327*** -0.010***
 (-2.64) (-2.97) (-3.36) (-9.84) (-3.18) (-4.01)
Investor Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE, State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964 90964
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Table A4 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Performance/Portfolio Strategy: 
Top 20 Ranked State Golf Courses by Golflink.com 
 
This table presents results on the relation between portfolio performance/strategy and closeness to 
prestigious golf courses using an alternative identification of prestigious state golf courses. Particularly, in 
each state, we obtain the location information of the top 20 golf courses from http://www.golflink.com/top-
golf-courses/. Then we calculate the close-to-golf for each investor using the same methodology as in the 
main analysis. In Panel A, we link close-to-golf to investment performance, using the same specifications as 
in Table II. In Panel B, we relate this alternative measure of close-to-golf to portfolio strategies. We always 
cluster the errors at the investor level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A: Investment Performance 
Dep. var.: Portfolio Alpha Market Adjusted Style Adjusted Style & Type Adjusted
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.107*** 0.119*** 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.096*** 0.110***
 (3.26) (3.37) (3.22) (3.41) (3.10) (3.31)
   
Log (Investor Size) -0.024** -0.030*** -0.008 -0.014 -0.007 -0.012
 (-2.45) (-3.09) (-0.94) (-1.58) (-0.74) (-1.38)
Log (Investor Age) -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.087***
 (-2.76) (-2.89) (-2.91) (-3.08) (-3.42) (-3.63)
   
Investor  Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463
R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.008
 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Strategies 
Dep. var.: Investment Strategies Portfolio Churn Rate Portfolio Concentration Portfolio Selectivity
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.364** 0.470*** 0.008** 0.009**
 (3.67) (4.12) (2.19) (2.62) (1.97) (2.01)
   
Log (Investor Size) 0.003 -0.000 -0.827*** -0.849*** -0.022*** -0.023***
 (1.20) (-0.02) (-12.99) (-13.21) (-20.14) (-20.97)
Log (Investor Age) -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.240 -0.249* -0.009*** -0.009***
 (-9.98) (-10.44) (-1.64) (-1.72) (-3.38) (-3.67)
   
Investor  Style FE, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463 97,463
R-squared 0.516 0.539 0.214 0.228 0.280 0.307
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Table A5 
Closeness to Golf and Investment Performance/Portfolio Strategy: 
Placebo Tests on Golf Courses with Bottom Decile Green Fees 
 
This table presents a “placebo” test based on golf courses in the bottom decile of green fees. Specifically, we 
rank the full sample of golf courses by their green fees and select the bottom decile courses as the set of 
interested golf courses. Then we calculate the close-to-golf for each investor using the same methodology as 
in the main analysis. In Panel A, we link close-to-golf to investment performances, using the same 
specifications as in Table II. In Panel B, we relate this alternative measure of close-to-golf to portfolio 
strategies. We always cluster the errors at the investor level. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Investment Performance 
Dep. var.: Portfolio Return Market Adjusted Style Adjusted Style & Type Adjusted
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.004 -0.040 0.037 -0.002 0.017 -0.023
 (0.07) (-0.61) (0.65) (-0.04) (0.30) (-0.40)
   
Log (Investor Size) -0.021** -0.026*** -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009
 (-2.05) (-2.61) (-0.54) (-1.09) (-0.48) (-1.05)
Log (Investor Age) -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.093***
 (-2.94) (-3.09) (-3.25) (-3.46) (-3.53) (-3.75)
   
Investor Type FE, Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118
R-squared 0.102 0.104 0.088 0.090 0.089 0.091
 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Strategies 
Dep. var.: Investment Strategies Portfolio Churn Rate Portfolio Concentration Portfolio Selectivity
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf 0.008 -0.029* 0.035 0.016 0.001 -0.008
 (0.51) (-1.76) (0.11) (0.05) (0.12) (-0.86)
   
Log (Investor Size) 0.002 -0.001 -0.716*** -0.730*** -0.022*** -0.023***
 (0.86) (-0.23) (-16.57) (-16.69) (-20.81) (-21.47)
Log (Investor Age) -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.301*** -0.327*** -0.009*** -0.010***
 (-9.85) (-10.22) (-2.85) (-3.16) (-3.48) (-3.89)
   
Investor Type FE, Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE - Y - Y - Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118 93,118
R-squared 0.509 0.531 0.212 0.232 0.283 0.311
 
 
 
11 
 
Table A6 
Closeness to Golf and Risk-Adjusted Investment Performance:  
Weather Around Golf Courses 
 
The table presents results on the relation between close-to-golf, risk- and characteristic-adjusted returns, 
and weather.  
 
Panel A: Weather Around Golf Courses and DGTW Adjusted Portfolio Returns 
Panel A examines the relation between investor close-to-golf, weather and the DGTW adjusted portfolio 
returns. We follow the methodology developed in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) to 
calculate the DGTW adjusted portfolio returns. The close-to-golf measure is based on the full set of 
prestigious golf courses as well as separate measures based on the guest policies of golf courses. ***, ** and 
* represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics 
given in parentheses. 
 
Dep. var.: Portfolio DGTW All Golf Courses Guest Policy: Reciprocal Guest Policy: Closed
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf ×  
Good Weather Dummy I 
0.144***
(2.88) 
0.171***
(3.03) 
0.076** 
(2.15) 
 
Close-to-golf × 
Good Weather Dummy II 
 0.172***
(3.25) 
0.170***
(3.07) 
 0.110***
(3.08) 
   
Close-to-golf -0.009 -0.020 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.015
 (-0.25) (-0.53) (-0.10) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.58)
Good Weather Dummy I -0.055** -0.049* -0.054* 
 (-2.04) (-1.73) (-1.91) 
Good Weather Dummy II  -0.069** -0.065**  -0.067**
  (-2.58) (-2.34)  (-2.40)
Log (Investor size) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** -0.020**
 (-2.71) (-2.71) (-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.40) (-2.40)
Log (Investor age) -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077***
 (-3.53) (-3.53) (-3.62) (-3.62) (-3.63) (-3.62)
   
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 89,970 89,970 85,685 85,685 85,685 85,685
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Table A6 (continued) 
Panel B: Weather of Golf Courses and Portfolio Alphas 
Panel B presents results on the relation between the close-to-golf measure, weather and the risk adjusted 
portfolio alphas. The regression specification are identical to Table IV, which includes the interaction of 
close-to-golf with the weather condition of golf courses with the inclusion of investor fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-
statistics given in parentheses. 
 
Dep. var.: Portfolio Alpha CAPM 1-factor Fama-French 3-factor Carhart 4-factor
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close-to-golf ×  
Good Weather Dummy I 
0.201***
(4.00) 
0.090**
(2.03) 
0.123*** 
(2.84) 
 
Close-to-golf × 
Good Weather Dummy II 
 0.207***
(4.34) 
0.096**
(2.28) 
 0.134***
(3.06) 
   
Close-to-golf 0.020 0.020 0.054* 0.053* 0.061* 0.058
 (0.52) (0.52) (1.78) (1.70) (1.68) (1.59)
Good Weather Dummy I -0.039 -0.057* -0.073** 
 (-1.18) (-1.92) (-2.43) 
Good Weather Dummy II  -0.036 -0.065**  -0.074**
  (-1.12) (-2.22)  (-2.55)
Log (Investor size) -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.015* -0.015* -0.024*** -0.024***
 (-3.50) (-3.51) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-2.73) (-2.73)
Log (Investor age) 0.009 0.009 -0.050* -0.050* -0.056** -0.056**
 (0.29) (0.29) (-1.78) (-1.78) (-2.03) (-2.03)
   
Year-Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Investor Style, Type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor Investor
Number of Observations 83,309 83,309 83,309 83,309 83,309 83,309
 
 
